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Abstract
Starting in 1999, the Bologna Process reformed the German five-year study system for
a first degree into the three-year bachelor’s (BA) system to harmonize study lengths in
Europe and improve competitiveness. This reform unintentionally challenged the German
apprenticeship system that offers three-year professional training for the majority of school
leavers. Approximately 29% of new apprentices are university-eligible graduates from
academic-track schools. We evaluate the effects of the Bologna reform on new highly
educated apprentices using a generalized difference-in-differences design based on detailed
administrative student and labor market data. Our estimates show that the average regional
expansion in first-year BA students decreased the number of new highly educated apprentices
by 3%–5%; average treatment effects on those indecisive at school graduation range between
–18% and –29%. We reveal substantial gender and occupational heterogeneity: males in
STEM apprenticeships experienced the strongest negative effects. The reform aggravated
the skills shortage in the economy.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades, many countries have expanded university education to foster
technological progress and economic growth. In addition to university education as a
primary source of qualified labor, some countries, such as Germany—or, less recognized,
Switzerland, Austria and Denmark—have a so-called dual apprenticeship system. It
provides professional training for a large part of the population.1 This system is believed
to create economic benefits through two main channels: (1) occupation-specific skill
formation in combination with close links between trainees and employers can facilitate
the labor market entry of youth (see, e.g., Ryan, 2001; Zimmermann et al., 2013), and
(2) firms’ views of apprenticeships can be both production-oriented, as a source of cheap
labor, and investment-oriented, as a way to secure their future supply of skilled workers
(Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2010; Wolter and Ryan, 2011). Originally, the dual
apprenticeship system in Germany targeted school leavers from the non-academic track.
However, since there is no restriction on who may participate, many high school graduates
from the academic track have also been trained.2 This group has become increasingly
important due to the size of its supply over recent years. In 2017, 29% of new apprentices
were qualified for university—compared to 16% in 2000 (BIBB, 2009, 2019).
Against this backdrop, we investigate the question of whether the introduction
of bachelor’s (BA) degrees due to the Bologna Process initiated in 1999 has
challenged the dual apprenticeship system. In Germany, the former single-cycle degree
system—awarding, e.g., the so-called Diplom degree—was replaced by a new two-cycle
system of consecutive BA and master’s (MA) degrees.3 As a result, the hurdles to
obtaining a first university degree were lowered (reductions in study length and effective
costs), which arguably increased the attractiveness of a university education compared
to apprenticeship training. In addition, employability—the former unique selling point of
apprenticeships—was introduced as a key feature of academia. Therefore, high school
graduates from the academic track, i.e., those who are eligible for both a university
education and an apprenticeship, may increasingly opt for a university education rather
than apprenticeship training. We present evidence on this hypothesis and estimate
the effect of the introduction of BA degrees on the regional supply of highly educated
apprentices. In doing so, we reveal trade-offs within the post-secondary education system
that could limit the potential benefits of university education expansion policies.
1In Germany, vocational education and training (VET) represents the most common qualification level of
the population aged 15 years or older (48% in 2017 (Destatis, 2018a)), and it is the largest sector of post-
secondary education (BIBB, 2019, see also Figure A-1 in the appendix). The definition of VET includes both
dual apprenticeship training and full-time vocational schools, with the former accounting for the significantly
larger share.
2The academic track in German high schools provides the prerequisites for going to university.
3There are still very few exceptions: Courses leading to the regulated professions in law and medicine still
award the so-called state certificate (Staatsexamen). The same holds for teaching courses in some German federal
states, such as Bavaria. Later, at the Ministerial Conference Berlin 2003, the doctoral level was included as a
third cycle of the new degree system.
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For the empirical analysis, we make use of a combined panel data set on the level
of 141 German regional labor markets delineated by commuter links for the observation
period 1997 to 2011. Hence, we cover the whole implementation process from 1999 to 2010
plus two additional pre-treatment years and one year afterwards. Our data set contains
detailed administrative data from the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) on first-year
students, which allows us to exploit regional, temporal and area-of-study variation in the
demand for BA courses. These data are matched with information on new apprentices
per region, occupational area and year from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market
Biographies (SIAB) provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Using
information on the type of school qualification, we can identify the number of new highly
educated apprentices, i.e., those who come from the academic school track and are eligible
for both a university education and an apprenticeship.
Our identification strategy uses a generalized difference-in-differences (DiD) approach.4
Due to the specific institutional context of the Bologna Process in Germany, the expansion
of first-year BA students in Germany exhibits high spatial and temporal variation. First,
federal states set the legal framework on the extent to which the reform had to be
implemented. Second, universities could freely decide on the timing of the implementation
of the new program structure, as long as it was completed by 2010. This led to
large differences in reform adoption between universities, between departments within
universities, and, hence, between regions and areas of study over time. Since there is
little evidence of anticipation effects, we can exploit the expansion of BA degrees as a
natural experiment that is arguably exogenous to the post-secondary education decisions
of school leavers from the academic track. This setup enables us to estimate the causal
effect of the expansion of first-year BA students on the supply of new highly educated
apprentices on the level of regional labor markets. We conduct an event study that allows
us to show that regions with different adoption paths for BA programs had parallel trends
in new highly educated apprentices before the policy change.
Our empirical estimates show that the regional expansion of first-year BA students
across the whole observation period on average leads to a decrease in the number of new
highly educated apprentices by 3%–5%. This effect is robust to a large set of different
specifications (including region-specific linear time trends) and is supported by falsification
tests on less-educated apprentices. This suggests that the introduction of the BA degree
system due to the Bologna Process challenged the dual apprenticeship system, as more
high school graduates from the academic track have decided against apprenticeships.
Our results further reveal important gender and occupational heterogeneity. The
negative effects seem to be driven in particular by males (–5%), whereas there is little
4Similar approaches can be found in, e.g., Berlinski et al. (2009), Havnes and Mogstad (2011), Bauernschuster
et al. (2016), and Sandner and Thomsen (2020) in the context of child care reforms, Ruhose et al. (2020) in the
context of a partial retirement reform and elderly learning and Cantoni et al. (2017) in the context of evaluating
the effects of a school curricula reform on students’ political attitudes in China.
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evidence for overall effects for females. Looking at different occupational areas, the largest
negative effects are found for “science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)”
occupations, which are entirely attributable to changes in decisions by men (–7% to –11%).
Smaller negative effects (–3% to –4%) are estimated for the biggest occupational area,
“business”—but only for women. Scaling the intention-to-treat effects (ITT) with the
share of school leavers who are indecisive half a year before graduation, we obtain even
larger average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) for the full sample of between –18%
and –29%, and for males of –29%. Moreover, differentiating the number of first-year
BA students by areas of study reveals not only an increase in educational attainment
(upgrading) but also some adjustments in major choice. For instance, the decrease in
new highly educated male apprentices in STEM occupations is caused by an increase in
first-year BA students in STEM, economics and “health, social work, education” majors.
These switches in occupational pathways to different, albeit mostly related, fields could
have consequences for future returns to university education, as different fields of study
offer different payoffs (Altonji et al., 2012; Kirkeboen et al., 2016).
These findings may have important consequences for economic, individual and fiscal
returns to education. First, a lower supply of highly educated apprentices aggravates
the skills shortage in Germany, as apprenticeship training helps to reduce the number of
unfilled qualified jobs (Bellmann and Hübler, 2014). The skills shortage exists in particular
in those professions (STEM) where we find the strongest negative effects (Seyda and
Bußmann, 2014). Second, with respect to expected individual returns to education, there
may be adverse impacts at different stages of one’s career. Since vocational education and
training (VET) graduates generally have higher employment probabilities in the early
stages of their career than university graduates (Brunello and Rocco, 2017; Golsteyn
and Stenberg, 2017; Hanushek et al., 2017), young labor market entrants may encounter
greater difficulties in finding adequate jobs initially. Over the life cycle, however, university
graduates in Germany typically recoup their relative losses and earn on average 420,000
euros more than VET graduates (Pfeiffer and Stichnoth, 2015). Third, the net average
fiscal return to a university graduate (5 years) compared to a VET graduate (4 years)
is estimated at between 100,000 euros (Pfeiffer and Stichnoth, 2015) and 130,000 euros
(OECD, 2014). Thus, a reduced supply of highly educated apprentices implies a net fiscal
gain for government budgets. Conducting a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation based
on these numbers, our estimate of 16,600 to 27,600 fewer new highly educated apprentices
over the whole observation period could result in a net fiscal gain of approximately 1.66
to 3.59 billion euros in total—assuming a one-to-one replacement of VET with university
graduates. Since fiscal returns for highly educated apprentices are probably larger than the
average return, our back-of-the-envelope calculation can be considered an upper bound
estimate of the overall effect and should be interpreted with care. For instance, the
different returns to education further depend very much on wage adjustments due to a
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higher supply of university educated workers, shifts in the skill distribution of graduates
with new and former degrees, as well as the quality of their job matching.
This paper contributes to at least three strands of related literature. First, we
add evidence on the evaluation of the Bologna Process with respect to post-secondary
education decisions. To date, existing research has provided mixed results. Some studies
find positive effects on university enrollment for Italy (Cappellari and Lucifora, 2009;
Di Pietro, 2012; Bondonio and Berton, 2018) as well as for Portugal (Cardoso et al.,
2008). For Germany, in contrast, no effects on total enrollment (Horstschräer and
Sprietsma, 2015) or on the participation of students from low socio-economic backgrounds
(Neugebauer, 2015) have been reported. Compositional changes in post-secondary
education entrants, however, have not been considered in that literature. Indeed, our
results suggest that the reform affected very specific groups of school leavers: in particular,
men who are likely to take technical apprenticeships seem to evaluate their probability
of success at university higher than they did before. By focusing on the dual system,
we thus reveal unintended side effects that need to be considered to fully evaluate the
reform. Second, we contribute to the literature on post-secondary education choices
by providing evidence on how changes in incentive structures affect choices between
different educational pathways on an aggregate level. In particular, we tie in with the
rational action theory literature, conceptualized by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) and
empirically tested, for instance, by Becker and Hecken (2009). Our results support the
effectiveness of the “perceived probability of success” channel (see above), as well as
the “reduction in study costs” channel, as school leavers seem to have switched to BA
courses, especially in those regions and years with tuition fees in effect. Third, we add
evidence on the responsiveness of the dual apprenticeship system to shifts in supply or
demand. Available studies for Germany have looked at exogenous supply shocks due to
an expansion of high school graduate cohorts and report an increase in the number of
training contracts, indicating elastic apprentice demand of firms and no crowding-out
of less-educated persons (Price et al., 2017; Muehlemann et al., 2018). Another set of
studies focuses on the reaction of the apprenticeship system to economic crises (see, e.g.,
Brunello, 2009; Bellmann et al., 2014; Lüthi and Wolter, 2020). Adding to this literature,
our results point towards a limited substitutability (if any) between apprentices of different
qualifications, as less-educated apprentices benefit only marginally from less competition
with highly educated apprentices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we outline the institutional
framework and give an overview of the literature to date (Section 2). After a short
description of our data (Section 3), we discuss the empirical strategy and its underlying
identification assumptions (Section 4). Section 5 presents the empirical results including
heterogeneity analyses and robustness checks. Section 6 discusses magnitudes and
conducts a cost-benefit analysis. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background
2.1 The German Education System
After four years of elementary school, German pupils aged approximately ten years old
are divided into three different tracks that have traditionally implied very distinct career
pathways (see Figure 1): the academic track in high schools provides the prerequisites for
going to a university or university of applied sciences (Abitur).5 Approximately three-
quarters of these graduates actually make use of their university entrance qualifications,
while a bit less than the remaining quarter enters the VET system (Schneider et al., 2017).
These ratios have remained fairly stable since the early 2000s. However, since the share of
high school graduates from the academic track has risen, they have become increasingly
important for the apprenticeship market. While in 2000, only 16% of all new apprentices
had a university entrance qualification, by 2017, their share had almost doubled to 29%
(BIBB, 2009, 2019).
< Insert Figure 1 here >
In contrast, school leavers that do not achieve the highest formal school certificate
can either enter the labor market directly or enter the VET system, which allows them
to achieve at least a medium-skill level. Traditionally, high school graduates with a
secondary general school certificate (Hauptschulabschluss) have headed mostly towards
blue-collar occupations or handicrafts, while high school graduates with an intermediate
school certificate (Mittlerer Schulabschluss) have aimed more for white-collar professions.
Due to the educational expansion over the last decades, the separation of these different
career pathways has eroded, but it still holds to some extent.
Inside the VET system, three different tracks can be chosen. The most common
(49% in 2017 (AGER, 2018)) is the dual apprenticeship system, where on-the-job training
is combined with formal education in vocational schools. Alternatively, school leavers
can opt for vocational education that consists solely of full-time schooling (22% in 2017
(AGER, 2018)) or they can be placed in the so-called transition system (29% in 2017
(AGER, 2018)), which is designed to absorb excess supply and prepare school leavers for
a subsequent apprenticeship (Riphahn and Zibrowius, 2016), but has recently lost much
of its importance (see Figure A-1 in the appendix).
The German dual apprenticeship system (first track) can be characterized as highly
regulated, institutionalized and competitive. Currently, there are 325 officially recognized
training occupations (BIBB, 2019). Training in each of those professions is undertaken in
accordance with the respective nation-wide training regulations, where length, professional
skills subject to the vocational training, curricula and examination requirements are
5At German universities, there are basically no admissions tests. Instead, the selection of students is ensured
by graduation from an academic-track high school.
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specified (Vocational Training Act (BBiG) §4,2 and §5,1). The length of an apprenticeship
should be in general no longer than three and not less than two years, although there are
(very few) exceptions. The vast majority, however, lasts three years (76% of all recognized
occupations in 2018 (BIBB, 2019)).
During that time, apprentices spend one or two days per week in vocational
schools, and the rest in on-the-job training. Hence, the dual system combines general
skill formation, such as basics in mathematics and science or language skills, with
occupation-specific knowledge. Nevertheless, training is considered to be general in
nature, as standardized curricula restrict firms’ ability to provide firm-specific skills
(Mohrenweiser et al., 2019).
Firms usually have to bear net costs per apprentice and year of approximately 5,400
euros on average, according to the latest survey of the Federal Institute for Vocational
Education and Training (BIBB) from 2012/13 (Wenzelmann et al., 2015).6 These net
costs are derived from returns of approximately 12,500 euros from productive work and
gross costs of approximately 17,900 euros consisting of expenses for trainers and training
infrastructure as well as the apprentice’s wage, which is usually bargained for between
the social partners (employers and unions) for a specific industry and in a specific region.
In 2017, monthly apprentice wages were 876 euros on average. Regions in East Germany
and the crafts sector had substantially lower wages, while regions in West Germany and
the “Industry and Commerce” sector pay above-average wages. For instance, the highest
wages are paid for bricklayers (1,159 euros) and mechatronics engineers (1,088 euros),
whereas the lowest are paid for hair stylists (584 euros) and chimney sweepers (518 euros)
(BIBB, 2019).7
Despite these average net costs, firms are willing to train. Since retention rates are
high (68% in 2016 (AGER, 2018)), they can save on hiring costs later on (Mohrenweiser
and Zwick, 2009; Blatter et al., 2016) and use training as a screening device to find the
most able and best-matched employees by exploiting information asymmetries (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1998, 1999). Firms that follow investment-oriented strategies therefore show
a highly selective hiring practice and are not willing to train those with an educational
level below a certain threshold (Muehlemann et al., 2018). Indeed, Price et al. (2017) and
Muehlemann et al. (2018) find that exogenous supply shocks to high-quality applicants
are accompanied by a right-ward shift in firms’ apprentice demand. This holds in
particular for medium- and large-sized firms from the “Industry and Commerce” sector,
which tend to have large internal markets and can attract the most qualified school
leavers (Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2010). As a result, high school graduates
from the academic track tend to opt for very specific, mostly clerical jobs. For instance,
6However, motivations can be heterogeneous, as some firms are able to recoup training costs and pursue
substitution-oriented strategies (Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2010).
7For comparison, the median gross monthly wage for full-time employees subject to social security
contributions (excluding trainees) was 3,209 euros in 2017 (BIBB, 2019).
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the 10 most popular professions accounted for approximately 45% of all new trainees
from the academic school track in 2017, and among those, management assistant jobs
(e.g., “industrial management assistant”, “management assistant for wholesale and foreign
trade”) as well as IT jobs (“computer science expert”) were especially favored (BIBB,
2019). Apart from a few exceptions, high school graduates from the non-academic track
represent the minority in these professions (BIBB, 2019) and thus have low chances of
obtaining these training positions. Consequently, a decrease in apprentice supply by
graduates from the academic school track may lead to more relaxed competition for the
most attractive apprenticeships—albeit only if firms do not withdraw from offering these
positions in response to the lower educational levels available.
2.2 The Bologna Process
In 1999, 29 European countries agreed to harmonize their national higher education
systems and create a coherent transnational system, the European Higher Education
Area (EHEA). This so-called Bologna Process aimed at promoting European citizens’
employability, competitiveness and mobility within the EHEA. At its core, a two-cycle
higher education system (undergraduate and graduate) was introduced and accompanied
by easily readable and comparable degrees as well as a common system of credits (Bologna
Declaration, 1999).8 While in some countries (e.g., UK) only a mild restructuring
was required, other countries, such as Germany, Italy and Portugal, had to undertake
major reforms of their higher education systems (Neugebauer, 2015). In Germany, the
established single-cycle system awarding either Diplom, Magister, or Staatsexamen was
replaced by the new two-cycle system of consecutive BA and MA degrees.
This change in the structure of university education probably affected the
post-secondary education decisions of high school graduates from the academic track.
According to rational action theory (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), these decisions are
determined by the expected costs and returns and the perceived probability of success.9
In what follows, we argue that the Bologna Process altered the preconditions under
which school leavers decide in favor of academic education by reducing study costs and
emphasizing employability.
2.2.1 Reduction in costs
The Bologna Process shortened the regular study duration to obtain a first degree by
approximately one-third from 4–5 years to only 3–3.5 years.10 The effective study duration
8At the Ministerial Conference Berlin 2003, the doctoral level was included as a third cycle in the new degree
system.
9Expectations in turn are affected by preferences and abilities (e.g. Arcidiacono et al., 2012; Wiswall and
Zafar, 2015). Further determinants are for instance family background (Björklund and Salvanes, 2011) and peer
group effects (Bobonis and Finan, 2009).
10At the moment, approximately 94% of all BA programs at universities have a regular study duration of six
semesters. At universities of applied sciences it is mostly six (33%) and seven semesters (54%) (HRK, 2019).
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was reduced even more as the median study duration for a BA degree was 7.1 semesters in
2017 compared to 11.5 semesters for a former university degree in 2000 (Destatis, 2018b).
Apprenticeships and BA degrees now take about the same amount of time (see Section
2.1), and thus, direct study costs as well as opportunity costs to obtain a first university
degree have decreased in relation to apprenticeships. According to a micro simulation
model for Germany from 2012, average opportunity costs in the form of lost income
amount to 18,200 euros per study year, compared to 6,500 euros for a dual apprenticeship
(Pfeiffer and Stichnoth, 2015).11
This argument is backed by empirical evidence on the impact of financial constraints
and financial aid on university enrollment. Decreased enrollment due to tuition fees is
widely reported in the Anglo-American context (e.g., Heller, 1997; Neill, 2009) and to a
small extent in Germany (Dwenger et al., 2012; Hübner, 2012), where tuition fees are—if
they exist at all—low and other studies cannot confirm their negative impact on enrollment
(Helbig et al., 2012; Bruckmeier and Wigger, 2014). Conversely, tuition decreases and
financial aid are found to increase college enrollment in the U.S. (e.g., Dynarski, 2003;
Abraham and Clark, 2006; Cornwell et al., 2006; Denning, 2017) and—again, to a much
lower extent—in Germany (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2012).
Ceteris paribus, the introduction of BA degrees may encourage more high school
graduates from the academic track to choose a university education over an apprenticeship.
This should particularly hold for students from non-academic backgrounds, as such
students are believed to be more cost-sensitive (Peter and Zambre, 2017). Relatedly,
the effects of the Bologna Process on apprentice supply may be particularly strong in
those years and regions where there were tuition fees.
2.2.2 Expected returns
Firms sent out clear signals from the beginning that BA graduates could hope for good
employment opportunities.12 Therefore, the labor market prospects for BA graduates
were assessed as very good at the beginning, although the true returns to a BA degree
were unknown. For instance, the first reports on the labor market outcomes of new
graduates for Germany were not available until 2011 (see, e.g., Briedis et al., 2011;
Rehn et al., 2011; Schomburg, 2011). Recently, positive and—in relation to VET—higher
individual returns to a university education in general (see Pfeiffer and Stichnoth, 2015,
2018, for Germany) and to BA degrees specifically (Neugebauer and Weiss, 2018) are
documented. In terms of employment probabilities, however, vocational education seems
to outperform university education at the early stages of the career due to higher skill
specificity (Brunello and Rocco, 2017; Golsteyn and Stenberg, 2017; Hanushek et al.,
11Currently, there are no tuition fees in Germany. However, seven of 16 federal states introduced low tuition
fees of up to 500 euros per semester between 2006 and 2007 and abolished them again between 2008 and 2014
(Thomsen and von Haaren-Giebel, 2016).
12See the “Bachelor Welcome!” initiative among leading German companies in 2004 (Neugebauer, 2015).
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2017).13 In line with these general comparisons, Neugebauer and Weiss (2018) report
higher risks of unemployment for BA graduates from universities than for VET graduates,
although not for BA graduates from universities of applied sciences. They explain this
finding by appealing to the higher practical orientation and closer university-employer
links at universities of applied sciences. However, even with available information on
returns, students’ individual beliefs and expectations can differ substantially. Among
others, Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013) and McGuigan et al. (2016) show that the provision
of information on costs and returns increases not only students’ knowledge but also their
likelihood of enrollment. Peter and Zambre (2017) report that for the low-tuition context
of Germany, information provision on benefits increases college enrollment, particularly
for students from non-academic families.
2.2.3 Increase in perceived probability of success
One of the major aims of the Bologna Process was to enhance the employability of
university graduates. Although no clear targets have been set and no EHEA-wide
curricula change has been implemented, a vast range of employability goals emerged from
the public debate during the Bologna Process. These can be categorized into two major
thrusts. First, the so-called key competencies were introduced into curricula to foster
general competencies unrelated to the respective majors, such as rhetoric, presentation
skills or foreign languages. Second, a strong focus was placed on practice-oriented learning
to strengthen links between academia and (future) occupational tasks. For instance, the
integration of practitioners as part-time lecturers was emphasized, and internships were
made mandatory for a broad range of BA programs (Teichler, 2011). According to data
from the recent Graduate Panel from 2013 by the German Centre for Higher Education
Research and Science Studies (DZHW), 62% of all BA graduates from universities and
76% of all BA graduates from universities of applied sciences had to complete at least
one compulsory internship during their studies (Fabian et al., 2016). In contrast, of the
2001, 2005 and 2009 graduation cohorts, only 48% of all former graduates completed a
mandatory internship according to Margaryan et al. (2020). Hence, university education
became more oriented towards labor market needs than before, which holds in particular
for those universities where practical application was not stressed to the same extent as
at universities of applied sciences (Witte et al., 2008).
These shifts in curricula from less theoretical to more practical content may have
increased the perceived probability of success and induced some high school graduates
from the academic track to go to a university instead of doing an apprenticeship.
13There is also some, albeit less consistent, evidence that this pattern reverses in the later stages of the career
path (at around the age of 50), which is explained by the more general training of a university education that allows
for greater flexibility and adaptability to technological change later on (Golsteyn and Stenberg, 2017; Hanushek
et al., 2017). However, Brunello and Rocco (2017) cannot confirm the reversal of employment probabilities in the
later stages of the career path in favor of university education.
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3 Data
To estimate the effect of BA degrees on regional apprentice supply, we combine data
from different administrative sources for the observation period 1997 to 2011. First,
we make use of the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB) to count
new apprentices per region, occupational area and year. Second, we draw on data from
the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis) to exploit region× area-of -study ×
year variation in first-year BA students. These data are merged on the level of 141
German regional labor markets defined by Kosfeld and Werner (2012), which have several
advantages compared to counties: regional labor markets are delineated by commuter links
and, therefore, represent homogeneous functional areal units that reflect actual economic
conditions better than administrative units such as counties.14 It can be assumed that
place of residence and place of work coincide within the same region. Moreover, between
64% (1997) and 82% (2011) of all regional labor markets contain at least one university or
university of applied sciences (see Figure A-2 in the appendix). Taking into account that
apprentices are rather immobile (nine out of ten trainees stay in the county they live in or
in neighboring counties (Jost et al., 2019)), these regions can be considered the primary
search area for post-secondary education opportunities. This also holds for apprentices
qualified for university, who are only slightly more mobile than the average apprentice
(1.5 out of ten migrate beyond neighboring districts (Jost et al., 2019)).15
3.1 New Apprenticeships
Information on new apprentices is obtained from the SIAB provided by the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB).16 The SIAB is a representative 2% random sample
of all employees subject to social security contributions in Germany and represents
approximately 80% of the labor force in Germany, excluding, e.g., civil servants, soldiers,
and the self-employed. Apprentices are generally subject to social security contributions
and are therefore contained in the SIAB. They can be clearly identified by their
employment status (“trainee”), and the data include detailed individual-level information
such as sex, age, school leaving qualification, place of work at the county level and
occupation (3-digit level). One limitation of the SIAB, however, is that it only allows us
14The definition of regional labor markets by Kosfeld and Werner (2012) is comparable to local labor markets,
which are used, for instance, in Autor et al. (2013) and Autor and Dorn (2013)
15Most university students in Germany also tend to enroll near to their home place (Dwenger et al., 2012;
Haussen and Uebelmesser, 2018). Based on application data from the German central clearing house for the
years 2002 to 2008, Dwenger et al. (2012) report a baseline probability of applying in the home state of 69%. A
similar size is found for graduates that studied in their home state by Haussen and Uebelmesser (2018) based on
data from the DZHW Graduate Panel for the 2004/05 graduation cohort. In addition, distance to the nearest
university affects enrollment decisions negatively (Spiess and Wrohlich, 2010).
16The data basis of this paper is the weakly anonymous Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB)
1975 - 2014. The data were accessed on-site at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency
at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and/or via remote data access at the FDZ. See Antoni et al.
(2016) for a detailed description of this data source.
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to observe actual apprentices and not those applicants who do not find an apprenticeship
position. Since the actual apprentice supply can therefore not be measured, our estimates
merely reflect the effects on filled apprenticeship positions resulting from successful
matches.
To identify new apprentices, we follow the official definition of the Federal Statistical
Office of Germany for newly concluded training contracts and count establishment entries
of persons with the employment status “trainee” who do not drop out until the end of the
same calendar year (Destatis, 2019). Hence, this definition includes not only new entrants
into apprenticeships but also apprentices who change their training firm (excluding those
in the same calendar year or in the second half of the previous year to avoid double-
counting).17
The data on employment biographies (status and dates of employment, wages, etc.)
are highly reliable, as reporting is mandatory and employers face penalties in cases of
mis- or non-reporting. Unfortunately, this does not hold for information on school leaving
qualifications, leading to missing values and inconsistencies. We correct these using one of
the heuristic imputation procedures proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006), which reduces
the share of missing school qualifications of new apprentices from approximately 15% to
less than 1%.18
Afterwards, we split the number of apprentices into highly and less-educated, i.e., those
who come from the academic school track and are eligible for both the academic and the
apprenticeship system and those who do not. We limit the observation period to the years
1997 to 2011 to avoid bias due to a change in reporting behavior. At the end of 2011,
a new occupation code (KldB 2010) was introduced by the Federal Employment Agency
that corresponds to the internationally acknowledged ISCO code. As a result, categories
for the school leaving qualifications were also changed, and some firms adjusted their
reporting, which led to a sharp increase in new highly educated apprentices. As shown in
the following section, the selected time horizon still captures the full implementation of
17In contrast to Destatis, we are not able to identify follow-up contracts as long as they do not coincide with
an establishment change. However, these do not play a major role and only amount to approximately 1.1% of all
newly concluded training contracts in 2017 according to BIBB (2019). This also applies to occupation changes.
18Since the imputation procedure 1 (IP1) by Fitzenberger et al. (2006) leads to the most plausible numbers
(compared to official statistics), we report only the results for IP1. IP1 extrapolates education information
to subsequent spells with missing or lower levels of education (forward extrapolation). Afterwards, education
information from the first spell with non-missing information is extrapolated to previous spells with missing
information until a certain minimum age limit is reached (backward extrapolation). Actually, this imputation
rule was developed for the education variable in the former IABS. However, since the underlying heuristics are
the same, we can easily employ it to the school leaving qualification in the SIAB by making a few adjustments.
For instance, we set the minimum age for having at least a secondary general school certificate at 15 years and
for having a higher education qualification to 18 years. Since IP1 tends to overreport true educational status
(Hutter et al., 2015), we check the robustness of our results by additionally using the other two imputation
procedures (IP2A and IP3) as suggested by Fitzenberger et al. (2006), as well as the non-corrected information
on school leaving qualifications. The more sophisticated procedures IP2A and IP3 extrapolate only spells that
are considered valid, e.g., due to high-frequency reports of the same status. Using non-imputed numbers as well
as the two other imputation rules (IP2A and IP3) does not alter the results shown in Section 5.1 significantly.
These results are available upon request.
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the Bologna Process. Finally, we aggregate counts of new apprenticeships to the regional
labor market level by place of work and distinguish between four different occupational
areas: 1) “health, social work, education”, 2) “business, trade, services”, 3) “STEM”, and
4) “other” (see Table A-1 in the appendix).
The aggregate numbers of apprentices by type of qualification obtained from the SIAB
are depicted in Figure 2 and can be compared to the official (but less differentiable)
numbers provided by Destatis (“Statistics of Vocational Training”) to check their
plausibility. Although slightly overstated, they are in line with official reports and follow
the same patterns. As mentioned in Section 2.1, the supply of new highly educated
apprentices increases steadily both in absolute and relative size. Conversely, the number
of total new apprentices trends downwards in a fluctuating pattern, which is driven by
the group of less-educated apprentices.
< Insert Figure 2 here >
A couple of further plausibility checks are carried out on our data. The age
distributions of total and highly educated new apprentices seem plausible and correspond
to official numbers, although they are slightly overstated (total: mean age of 19.3 years
compared to 18.8 years in BIBB (2019); highly educated: mean age of 21.8 years compared
to 21.0 in 2017 in BIBB (2019)).19 As usual, most new apprentices start in August or
September (77% of the total, 70% of the highly educated). Approximately 91% of the
identified apprentices (95% of the highly educated) are indeed new entrants, while the
remaining consist of establishment changes or multiple apprenticeships. This corresponds
very well to the average 89% reported in BIBB (2019).
Moreover, Figure 3 disaggregates the total number of new highly educated apprentices
into the four different occupational areas for men (Panel A) and for women (Panel B). As
is evident from the figure, most of both males and females go into business occupations,
such as “industrial management assistant” or “management assistant for wholesale and
foreign trade”. This group appears to have a rather cyclical pattern of entrance behavior.
For males, STEM occupations represent the second largest group and have become
increasingly important (1997: 18%; 2011: 23%). In contrast, new highly educated female
apprentices in STEM occupations remain at a rather low level without showing major
changes. The second largest occupational area for females, however, is “health, social
work, education”, but the supply of female apprentices in this area exhibits declines in
absolute and relative size. Finally, the occupational area “other” consists of occupations
in handicraft or low-tech services and is of only marginal importance for highly educated
apprentices.
19Since we have only information on the year of birth, the age of new apprentices can only be calculated on a
yearly basis. The actual average age is therefore higher than the calculated age. This procedure corresponds to
the age calculation in BIBB (2019). However, until 2006, all new apprentices in the lower and upper age groups
are included in the average age calculation of BIBB (2019) at 16 and 24 years respectively. This may explain the
differences in the average age between the two data sets to some extent.
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< Insert Figure 3 here >
3.2 Expansion of First-year BA Students
To capture the regional and temporal variation in the introduction of BA degrees, we
use administrative data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis) on
all first-year students at publicly acknowledged universities (“Statistics of Students”).20
Although at an aggregated level, it allows us to make distinctions by sex, nationality,
field of study and type of degree studied for. These data are collected for each university
in academic years (summer term plus the following winter term).
We focus on universities and universities of applied sciences, and drop other types
of universities according to the classification of Destatis, such as colleges of theology,
colleges of art and music, colleges of education and colleges of public administration.21
Degrees from these schools are either not affected by the Bologna Process (see church and
teacher examinations) or direct students towards specific labor markets (civil services).
Correspondence colleges are excluded because they do not require on-site presence and
first-year students are not located in a specific region. Then, we assign every university to
one of 141 German regional labor markets and aggregate first-year students accordingly.
Moreover, the 62 fields of study are collapsed into five different areas of study: (1)
“humanities”, (2) “health, social work, education”, (3) “economics”, (4) “STEM”, and (5)
“other”, which contains the remaining fields of study, such as other social sciences or
agricultural, forest and food sciences (see Table A-2 in the appendix).
Panel A in Figure 4 shows the share of first-year BA students to the total number
of first-year students studying for a BA or a former degree, which represents the rate
of implementation of the new degree system and gives a first insight into its regional,
temporal and area-of-study variation (see also Table A-3 and Figure A-3 in the appendix).
As is evident from the figure, the replacement of former degrees by the new BA degrees
in Germany took a fairly long time, lasting for a period of approximately 12 years
and following an S-shaped pattern. In the first years, there were only a few early
adopters (in particular, private institutions) that shifted to the new system. Afterwards,
implementation accelerated, and most of the transition took place between 2004 and
2008. In those years, differences in implementation between regions peaked and later
declined as late adopters caught up. Finally, there were no additional major changes after
approximately 90% of the overall implementation, and a regional average implementation
rate of 93% was reached in 2012. On the aggregate level, the Bologna Process is thus
20Our data set combines a special evaluation provided by Destatis for the years 1997 to 2004 with an evaluation
obtained from the ICE database of science and education departments in the state ministries for the years 2005
to 2014. Both evaluations are based on the “Statistics of Students”.
21We also include the so-called Gesamthochschulen in North Rhine-Westphalia. Since they were transferred
into universities in 2003, we handle them accordingly. All in all, our sample covers approximately 94% of all
first-year students in 2011.
13
now finished—aside from the mentioned exceptions in law, medicine, and pharmacy.22
Looking at the five areas of study separately, we do not find any striking differences, even
though programs in “humanities” and “others” switched relatively early while programs
in “economics” and “health, social work, education” switched relatively late. Moreover,
engineering and, to a lesser extent, economics show more outliers at the end of the
implementation period.
< Insert Figure 4 here >
Next, we examine the absolute number of first-year BA students (see Panel B in
Figure 4). After a slow start, the expansion of first-year BA students accelerated, and the
average region already reached considerable case numbers in 2006, with approximately
1,000 first-year BA students in total. In 2011, the absolute numbers peaked for most
areas of study and remained rather stable in the following years. In contrast to the share
of first-year BA students, differences in the absolute number of first-year BA students per
region increased steadily until the end of the observation period (see Panel B in Figure
4 and Table A-4 in the appendix). Among the five areas of study, STEM accounts for
approximately 40%–50% of all first-year BA students in our sample and economics for
about one fourth—both slightly declining in recent years (see Figure 5). In contrast,
“health, social work, education” is becoming increasingly important and amounted to
approximately 14% of all first-year students in 2017.
< Insert Figure 5 here >
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Identification Approach
For identification, we employ a generalized difference-in-differences (DiD) approach that
exploits regional and temporal variation in reform adoption.23 In our case, variation
arises from the specific institutional context of the reform: while the federal states agreed
upon common structural guidelines for the implementation of the reform (e.g., length,
profile types of new programs), they could set the actual legislation on the scope of
implementation individually. For instance, some federal states (such as Bavaria) never
abolished state examinations for teaching degrees, while others (such as Saxony) never
22However, some regions (14 out of 116 university regions) still remained at a relatively low implementation
level of less than 80% in 2014. These regions either contain universities that are dominated by the less-affected
law and medicine courses (e.g., Heidelberg, Passau) or are located in East Germany, such as Dresden or Halle,
where Diplom studies are still possible and are quite noticeably demanded. For instance, in Dresden in 2017,
first-year students studying for former degrees still amount to approximately 2,115 or 44% of all first-year students
studying for a BA or a former degree.
23Similar approaches can be found in, e.g., Berlinski et al. (2009), Havnes and Mogstad (2011), Bauernschuster
et al. (2016), and Sandner and Thomsen (2020) in the context of child care reforms, Ruhose et al. (2020) in the
context of a partial retirement reform and elderly learning and Cantoni et al. (2017) in the context of evaluating
the effects of a school curricula reform on students’ political attitudes in China.
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completely abolished Diplom degrees. However, at a lower hierarchical level, universities
were allowed high levels of autonomy and could freely decide on the timing of the
implementation of the new program structure, as long as it was completed by 2010 (Alesi
et al., 2005). As a result, there were large differences in the reform adoption between
universities as well as between departments within universities during this transition
period (see, e.g., the case of the HU Berlin in Hahm and Kluve, 2019).
Although some departments intentionally accelerated or delayed the introduction of
the new program structure, we argue that the timing of the transition can be considered
exogenous from the point of view of school leavers who face post-secondary education
decisions in a certain regional labor market. According to the official implementation
guidelines for universities, new study programs were usually announced no earlier than
a year in advance (HRK, 2004). Hence, there was little leeway for anticipation effects,
and we can exploit the introduction of BA degrees as a natural experiment that caused
regional and temporal variation in the number of first-year BA students. This generalized
form of a DiD estimator can be written as follows:
yr,t = θBAstudr,t +X′r,tβ + αr + δt + t× αr + εr,t, (1)
where yr,t is the selected outcome of interest in region r at time t, and BAstudr,t is
the number of first-year BA students in region r at time t ∈ (1997 − 2011). Region
fixed effects (αr) and year fixed effects (δt) are included to account for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity between regions and for unobserved time effects that affect all
regions equally. In our most preferred specification, we additionally allow regions to
follow different individual trends over time (t×αr). Xr,t represents a matrix of covariates
that controls for time-variant factors that may influence the outcome variable of interest.
We will explain the rationale behind the choice of these controls below. Since our outcome
yr,t is a count variable (the number of new apprentices), we use a fixed effects Poisson
estimator (Wooldridge, 1999). Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of regional
labor markets (εr,,t).
In a second estimation, we investigate occupational heterogeneity and differentiate
apprentices by four occupational areas and first-year BA students by five areas of study.
Then, we run separate regressions for all (4 × 5) combinations using the following
specification:
yr,o,t = θBAstudr,s,t +X′r,tβ + αr + δt + t× αr + εr,t, (2)
where yr,o,t is the selected outcome of interest in region r for a certain occupational
area o ∈ (health/social work/education, STEM, business, other) at time t, and
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BAstudr,s,t is the number of first-year BA students in region r in a certain area of study s
∈ (humanities, health/social work/education, STEM, economics, other) at time t.24
The main group of interest is highly educated apprentices coming from the academic
school track who are eligible for both a university education and apprenticeship training.
Since we do not have individual-level data on educational choices and cannot observe
whose post-secondary education decision is affected by the introduction of BA courses,
we interpret the estimated coefficient θ as an ITT. It represents the equilibrium effect of
BA degrees on highly educated apprentice supply, including potential peer externalities
such as higher/lower competition for training or study places (see, e.g., Baker et al., 2008).
Following Baker et al. (2008) and Havnes and Mogstad (2011), the ITT can be scaled by
the probability of treatment to obtain an ATT. In our case, this would be the share of
school leavers who are still undecided half a year before leaving high school.
4.2 Selection of Covariates
By using region fixed effects, the speed and scope of the implementation of BA degrees
does not need to be unrelated to characteristics of the regional labor markets as long as
they remain stable across the observation period. However, if these regional characteristics
change over time and are correlated with the number of new apprentices, our empirical
results would be biased. Therefore, we include a set of control variables covering supply-
and demand-side effects. We consider the log number of school leavers as well as
the share of school leavers with university entrance qualifications as supply controls
to account for different trends in the cohort size and composition of school leavers.
For instance, demographic changes and educational expansion with respect to the size
and qualification of high school graduate cohorts may affect regions very differently.
Furthermore, educational reforms, such as the G8 reform, have created external supply
shocks for some federal states in some years that temporarily affect the competition for
training places.25 To capture different migration trends in the group of interest, we further
include the share of the population aged 18 to 25 years.
On the demand side, we use the unemployment rate to cover macroeconomic conditions
that may negatively affect firms’ demand for training (Brunello, 2009; Bellmann et al.,
2014; Lüthi and Wolter, 2020). In addition, there is evidence that business cycles affect
formal schooling decisions countercyclically (Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2012). Moreover,
the share of persons in employment in the industry sector should control for regional
differences in the contraction of that sector. Finally, we use the share of firms with
more than 250 employees as a further demand-side control for available training positions
24The asymmetry of occupational areas and areas of study is explained by the fact that they are not one-to-one
comparable. For instance, there are essentially no apprenticeships in humanities due to the lack of a practical
orientation.
25The G8 reform reduced mandatory time to obtain a university entrance qualification from 13 to 12 years.
It was implemented by most German federal states between 2001 and 2008, leading to double cohorts in several
years (the simultaneous graduation of cohorts within 12 and 13 years).
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(Kleinert and Kruppe, 2012). An overview of all included variables, their definitions and
sources is given in Table A-5 in the appendix.
4.3 Plausibility of the Identifying Assumptions
To identify θ as the causal effect of BA degrees on new apprentices, we assume
that—conditional on region and year fixed effects as well as controls—labor market
regions would have followed the same trend in new highly educated apprentices in the
absence of the Bologna Process. One major concern, however, may be that there are
still systematic regional differences, e.g., between regions with and without universities or
between regions with large and with small universities. Relatedly, BA programs may have
expanded, especially in those regions where technological progress leads to a high demand
for highly qualified labor. Hence, the expansion of BA degrees may not be exogenous to
new apprentices. To investigate this, we regress first-year BA students on several regional
covariates and condition on region and year fixed effects (column 1 in Table 1). Moreover,
we predict early, mid, and late strong BA expansion (above-median number of first-year
BA students in 2005, 2008, and 2011) using pre-treatment regional characteristics in 1999
(columns 2 to 4 in Table 1).
< Insert Table 1 here >
As the table shows, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no joint influence of regional
characteristics on the number of first-year BA students or on the timing and scope of the
expansion. Indeed, several regional covariates are significantly correlated with first-year
BA students or the timing of expansion. However, they are consistent with expected
differences in size (e.g., school leavers, population density) and the composition of
university and non-university regions (e.g., age and qualification distribution). Therefore,
we believe that they are not a threat to our identification strategy. In fact, by performing
an event-study analysis, we can further support the plausibility of the common trend
assumption. Figure 6 plots the event study estimates from a distributed lag model
following Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2020) with an effect window of three leads and
one lag, allowing for multiple events with varying treatment sizes.26 The short effect






r,t + αr + δt + εr,t, (3)
where the effect window is restricted to j periods after and j before the event and where the binned treatment




s=−∞∆xr,t−s if j = j
∆xr,t−j if j < j < j∑∞
s=j ∆xr,t−s if j = j.
(4)
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window is chosen in correspondence to our relatively short observation period of 15 years.
In addition, we do not expect any major treatment effect dynamics, as the effect of an
increase in first-year BA students on new apprentices should materialize in the same year.
As shown in Figure 6, the pre-trends are reasonably flat and never statistically significantly
different from zero at the 5% level, which supports the identifying assumption. In year 0,
we find a clear negative and significant effect amounting to approximately –9%. One year
later, the cumulative effect decreases to –6%. Including region-specific linear time trends
further flattens the estimates and reveals a clearer picture of no pre-trend and a stable
negative post-treatment effect without any sign of a delay, fade-out or push-back of the
effects later on.
< Insert Figure 6 here >
Nevertheless, to take this potential endogeneity issue seriously, we run different
specifications where we stepwise include 1) only region and year fixed effects, 2) the
time-varying regional characteristics explained previously and included for theoretical
reasons, and 3) region-specific linear time trends, which gives our most preferred
specification (see equation (1)) in the empirical analysis below. In addition, we check
the robustness of the results by 1) excluding non-university regions and 2) adding the
remaining covariates from the balancing test as further controls (see Section 5.3).
Another concern may be a potential violation of the stable unit treatment value
assumption (SUTVA) through spillovers between regions. However, since we use regional
labor markets based on commuter links and apprentices are a rather immobile group, most
of the school leavers likely search for an apprenticeship inside their region of residence (see
Section 3). Thus, it seems plausible to assume that those high school graduates from the
academic track who are deciding between an apprenticeship and a university education
are only affected by the expansion of BA courses within their region of residence. In this
case, the SUTVA should hold.
We can also rule out further forms of self-selection. It seems very unlikely that students
selected into certain school tracks, advanced/delayed their timing of graduation from high
school or moved between regions in order to benefit from or avoid treatment. To provide
some checks for this, we regressed the size and share of high school graduates from the
academic track as well as the share of the population aged 15 to 18 years on future first-year
BA students. None of the coefficients are significant (see Table A-6).27 Nevertheless, we
exclude the early period of the Bologna Process (2000-2004) as a robustness check to
investigate the sensitivity of our results to selective study choices.
27In addition, it is highly improbable that some regions slowed down the expansion of BA courses, in order to,
say, protect their dual apprenticeship system, as these regions represent functional units and their administrative
power is thus quite limited. The non-significant effects of the log number of trainees per 1,000 employees in the
balancing test and the expansion prediction also suggest no sorting of regions with a strong apprenticeship system




Panel A in Table 2 presents estimates of the average regional impact of first-year BA
students on new highly educated apprentices using equation (1). In column (1), we only
include region and year fixed effects. Column (2) additionally introduces covariates, and
column (3) adds region-specific linear time trends allowing every region to follow a different
trend in the number of new highly educated apprentices.28 As shown, all coefficients are
negative, but their size varies depending on the specification. While we find a small
and not statistically significant effect at the 5% level in the first two specifications, the
estimate doubles and becomes highly significant once we allow every region to follow an
individual linear time trend. This indicates that regions with a strong BA expansion
show a steeper pre-trend in new highly educated apprentices than those with a weak
expansion, which could place doubts on the exogeneity of the intervention. However,
since the pre-trends are reasonably flat and we do not find any evidence of a lagged
treatment effect, we are confident in interpreting this result as causal. The estimated
effect implies that the average regional expansion of first-year BA students during our
observation period (+2,628 from 1997 to 2011) led to a decrease in new highly educated
apprentices by approximately 3%–5% on average, which corresponds well to the estimates
obtained from the event-study analysis above. In absolute terms and scaled to account for
the total population, a 3%–5% decrease translates into an overall reduction in new highly
educated apprentices of between 3,500 and 5,900 in 2011 compared to the counterfactual
of no Bologna reform.
< Insert Table 2 here >
Panels B and C in Table 2 show separate estimates for males and females.29 As
can be seen, we find substantially to slightly larger negative and significant effects for
males. The coefficient for males is very robust to the different specifications and is stable
around –5%. In contrast, the coefficient in the female sample is—although also negative—
considerably smaller and at most weakly significant. Thus, we interpret the negative effect
on the total sample as mainly driven by males. In line with the descriptive evidence from
Figure 3 in Section 3.1, this finding suggests that males and females go into very distinct
apprenticeship markets, for instance, due to different occupational preferences that are
affected differently by the Bologna Process.
28Here and henceforth, all specifications including region-specific linear time trends are estimated in Stata
using the command ppmlhdfe to absorb the large number of fixed effects and obtain convergence (Correia et al.,
2019a,b).
29All gender separated regressions use gender-specific numbers of apprentices, first-year students and school




To investigate this potential occupational heterogeneity in more detail, we distinguish the
number of new apprentices by four occupational areas and the number of first-year BA
students by five areas of study. We run separate regressions for all 4 × 5 combinations
using equation (2) to look at both vertical shifts in educational attainment (e.g., STEM
major instead of STEM apprenticeship) and diagonal shifts (e.g., business major instead
of STEM apprenticeship). The 20 estimated coefficients are reported in Figure 7 and are
already scaled to the respective average increase in first-year BA students until 2011 to
ensure comparability between areas of study.30 Estimates marked by circles are obtained
from a specification that includes only region and year fixed effects, estimates marked
by diamonds add regional controls, and estimates marked by squares additionally include
region-specific linear time trends.
< Insert Figure 7 here >
Although many of the coefficients are insignificant, there are some significant effects
for certain combinations. Regarding STEM occupations, we find strong negative effects of
first-year BA students on new highly educated apprentices, which are driven in particular
from the linked STEM majors but also from economics studies. These estimates are very
robust to adding controls and including region-specific linear time trends. They indicate
that the average regional expansion in first-year BA students in STEM (economics)
reduced the number of new highly educated apprentices in STEM occupations by 9%
(–6%) in our preferred specification. Furthermore, we find robust negative effects of
first-year BA students in “other” majors (e.g., “social sciences, excluding economics”) on
the number of new highly educated apprentices in business occupations. However, at
–3%, it is less strong of an effect than those for STEM occupations. Moreover, there
is also some evidence for a negative effect of “health, social work, education” majors
on business occupations that amounts to approximately –3%, although including trends
drives the p-value of the coefficient slightly above the 5% threshold. Finally, with respect
to occupations in “health, social work, education” and in “other” fields, we do not find any
robust significant effects.
The identified gender heterogeneity could indicate that occupational pathways were
affected differently by the introduction of BA degrees. For instance, the large negative
effects on STEM occupations would suggest that technical apprenticeships are more prone
to competition from BA degrees than other occupations. This would be surprising, insofar
as Horstschräer and Sprietsma (2015) indeed found negative effects of the introduction of
BA degrees on enrollment in electrical and mechanical engineering majors (albeit positive
30Detailed regression results are provided in Tables A-7, A-8 and A-9 in the appendix.
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effects in computer sciences). However, our results show that the competition is not only
between linked areas but also between areas not directly related (such as economics majors
and STEM occupations).
b) Gender heterogeneity
As a next step, we investigate gender heterogeneity and estimate the regression models
separately for males and females (see Panel A and Panel B in Figure 8). Focusing on
STEM occupations first, we find that the negative effects reported in the total sample are
driven in particular by men, whereas there are somewhat positive, but mostly insignificant,
effects for women. The estimates suggest that the number of male first-year BA students
in STEM, economics and “health, social work, education” majors affect the number of
new highly educated male apprentices in STEM occupations negatively by 11%, 11% and
7%, respectively—already scaled to account for the average regional BA expansion in the
respective area of study. In contrast, there is some evidence of positive effects on new
highly educated female apprentices in STEM occupations, driven by female first-year BA
students in “other” majors and humanities. The former amounts to a positive effect of
9% in the most preferred specification, while the latter is only significant in the first two
specifications. However, with only 5% of all new highly educated apprentices in 2010,
STEM represents a rather small group for females compared to the 25% for males.
< Insert Figure 8 here >
Furthermore, the negative effects on business occupations seem to be driven by females.
Remarkably, the clearest effect comes from what are, at first sight, less related areas. We
estimate that female first-year BA students in “health, social work, education” majors
reduce the number of female highly educated new apprentices in business occupations by
4% —already scaled to account for the average regional BA expansion in the respective
area of study. Moreover, we find some, albeit less robust, evidence for negative effects
induced by economics majors (–4%) and humanities (–3%). For males, however, we
report almost no significant effects on apprenticeships in business occupations across all
specifications. In addition—consistent with the results from the total sample—we do
not find any robust significant effects on “health, social work, education” occupations for
either men or women. Finally, the effects on the marginal group of other occupations
(handicraft, low-tech services) seem to be more negative for men than for women, even
though none is very robust nor consistently signed.
c) Interpretation
Since gender differences persist on the level of the occupational subgroups, the
heterogeneous results suggest that very specific types of school leavers were affected by the
Bologna Process: first and foremost, men who are likely to take technical apprenticeships
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and, to a smaller extent, women who are likely to take business apprenticeships. This could
indicate that the attractiveness of these professions declined disproportionately in favor of
a university education. One possible channel may be that men with preferences for STEM
now assess their probability of success at university more highly than they had done before.
This is supported by the literature documenting gender gaps in STEM subjects and in
self-assessments. Specifically, Cimpian et al. (2020) show that—based on a longitudinal
student survey in the U.S.—less able women tend to refrain from studying STEM majors,
while men do not show this kind of hesitant behavior. Similarly, Lörz et al. (2011) find for
Germany that male school leavers from the academic track assess their individual chances
of success at university significantly more highly than females—conditional on identical
performance in secondary school. Another explanation for the gender heterogeneity (and
especially the opposite-signed effects in STEM occupations) could be different responses
to changes in competitive pressure. As studies on double high school graduation cohorts
show, greater competition increases the performance of males relative to females (Ors
et al., 2013; Morin, 2015), while the educational attainment of females tends to decrease
or is delayed (Meyer and Thomsen, 2016; Meyer et al., 2019). In our context, this could
suggest that women may refrain from studying, especially in those majors where more men
study, and would benefit from less competition for specific apprenticeship occupations,
such as in STEM fields.
Furthermore, differentiating the number of first-year BA students by areas of study
reveals not only an increase in educational attainment (upgrading) but also some
adjustments in major choice. For instance, the decrease in new highly educated male
apprentices in STEM occupations is caused by an increase in first-year BA students in
STEM, economics and “health, social work, education” majors. In addition, new highly
educated female apprentices in business occupations seem to be sensitive to a rise in
first-year BA students in “humanities”, as well as in other majors, but not in economics.
5.3 Robustness Checks
a) Unobserved heterogeneity
To check the validity of our results, we run several robustness checks. First, we address
concerns regarding unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, those regions with a high
expansion in first-year BA students may have also experienced a stronger increase in
labor demand for high-skilled workers and, thus, a stronger increase in the demand for
highly educated apprentices. Moreover, it could be the case that the most dynamic
university regions are particularly affected by urbanization trends and the in-migration of
specific population groups (e.g., females, foreigners), which could result in upward trends
in the apprentice supply. Therefore, we 1) exclude non-university regions and 2) add
the remaining covariates from the balancing test as further controls (see Section 4.3).
As shown in Table 3, the baseline estimates remain rather stable and significant. To be
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precise, excluding approximately 20% of the observations increases the size and standard
errors of the coefficients simultaneously in most of the specifications. The same holds for
the occupation-specific effects shown in Figure A-4 in the appendix (estimates marked
by squares). The large negative effects on STEM occupations for males and the modest
negative effects on business occupations for females seem to be supported.
< Insert Table 3 here >
Moreover, neither the baseline results nor the effects for the occupational subgroups are
changed considerably by including additional controls that account for differential trends
in labor demand and migration patterns, such as (i) the log GDP per capita, (ii) the
share of employees subject to social security contributions with academic qualifications,
(iii) the log population density, (iv) the share of females in the population and (v) the
share of foreign-born residents in the population (see Table 4 below and estimates marked
by diamonds in Figure A-4 in the appendix). Therefore, we are confident that our results
are not driven by systematic and unobserved heterogeneity.
< Insert Table 4 here >
b) Falsification tests and placebo treatments
Second, we perform a couple of falsification tests and use the number of less-educated
apprentices as the group that should be rather unaffected by the introduction of BA
degrees unless there are externalities, e.g., through higher or lower competition. As shown
in Table 5, most of the coefficients are positive but are close to zero and never statistically
significantly different from zero, which supports our empirical design and the previous
findings. The same patterns are observed with respect to occupational heterogeneity (see
Figure A-5 in the appendix), as none of the coefficients reveals a consistent or robust
effect. This would indicate that the competition for training places was not relaxed for
the less-educated to a significant extent and that the substitutability between less- and
more-educated apprentices is therefore limited.
< Insert Table 5 here >
In addition, we use first-year students studying for teaching certificates as well as
those studying for former degrees as placebo treatments (see Figure A-6 in the appendix).
While the former should be close-to-zero (because we expect little dependency between
apprenticeships and teaching apart from the occupational area “health, social work,
education”), the latter should point in the opposite direction than for first-year BA
students. Indeed, none of the coefficients for first-year male students studying for teaching
certificates are significant, and only one female area of study (“health, social work,
education”) has significant effects. In addition, most of the coefficients for first-year
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students studying for former degrees are also insignificant. However, for males, the
negatively affected occupational area, STEM, shows some positive coefficients with respect
to former-degree students. Again, this supports our interpretation of the results.
c) Selective study and major choice
Third, we investigate whether selective study and major choice drive our results. If
effective, we should see changing estimates depending on the choice of the observation
period. A deliberate selection into treatment was only conceivable at the beginning of
the Bologna Process when there were considerable options for former degrees. Therefore,
we exclude the early period of the Bologna Process (2000-2004) and estimate equations
(1) and (2) again.31 As shown in Table A-10 in the appendix, the coefficients—though
slightly larger—remain stable in most of the specifications. The negative effects in the
total sample are strongly supported, as are the non-significant effects for women. The
negative effects on new highly educated male apprentices, however, are only confirmed
for the first two specifications. However, the model fit is substantially reduced in the last
specification indicating that the trends could not be precisely estimated when excluding
the early period of the Bologna Process.
d) Tuition fees
Finally, we check the possibility of a confounding effect from the introduction and
abolishment of tuition fees (see Section 2.2.1). For instance, if first-year BA students
increased, especially in those regions where tuition fees were not introduced (or were
abolished), the estimated negative effect on apprentice supply would not be driven solely
by the introduction of BA degrees but also by tuition fees. Therefore, we interact our
treatment variable with a dummy indicating whether tuition fees were in place in a
certain region in a certain year. As shown in Table A-11 in the appendix, the negative
effect of first-year BA students remains significant and negative across the different
specifications—either solely or in interaction with tuition fees.
The same holds for the male sample in Panel B. Tuition fees heavily reinforce the
negative effect of first-year BA students—more than twice the baseline effect without
tuition fees. However, including region-specific linear time trends seems to pick up most
of the interaction effects, which could indicate that it confounds the reforms of tuition
fees and treatment effect dynamics. This supports our interpretation of the results so far
and points towards the effectiveness of the channel “reduction in study costs”, as school
leavers seem to have switched especially to BA courses in those regions and years with
tuition fees in effect. The effect is surprisingly strong, though, considering the low tuition
fees of only 500 euros per semester.




6.1 Magnitudes of the Effects
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we interpret the estimates as an ITT, which is an informative
figure for policy evaluation because it gives the overall change in apprentice supply
regardless of whether the assigned treatment was actually taken or not. However, to
design policies that aim to foster apprenticeships or enhance university enrollment, it
would be insightful to know the ATT, i.e., the effect on those who are actually affected by
the Bologna Process in their post-secondary education decisions. For instance, some
school leavers would have gone to university (always-takers) or would have done an
apprenticeship (never-takers) regardless of the introduction of BA degrees. Therefore,
we approximate a potential ATT by scaling the ITT with the share of school leavers who
have made neither a firm decision to study nor one to train, namely, 17% according to
Schneider and Franke (2014).32 Thus, an approximate ATT would be between –18% and
–29% in the total sample and –29% for males. As expected, the effect is quite large. It
represents the effect on a very specific group of school leavers who are indecisive half a
year before graduation. For this group, changes in incentive structures matter most, and
the Bologna Process had a strong impact on educational decisions.
6.2 Cost-benefit Analysis
The presented empirical findings may have important consequences for economic,
individual and fiscal returns to education. First, a reduced supply of highly educated
apprentices aggravates the skills shortage in Germany, as apprenticeship training helps
to reduce the number of unfilled qualified jobs (Bellmann and Hübler, 2014). In 2018,
a record high of 10% unfilled training places was reported (BIBB, 2019), indicating
that firms are increasingly facing problems in finding adequately qualified apprentices.
Moreover, recent labor market projections show that the labor demand for skilled workers
with completed VET will not decline but will even increase marginally in the near future
(Maier et al., 2015). Other projections for the European Union, such as the CEDEFOP
skill forecast, show a modest decline in demand for medium-skilled workers until 2030
(CEDEFOP, 2018). However, due to the labor market exit of the baby boomers, the
replacement demand for medium qualifications until 2030 is still substantial (57% as
a proportion of the 2016 employment level (CEDEFOP, 2018)). Therefore, the skills
shortage is considered to be one of the major threats to future economic development.
For instance, non-scientific estimates indicate that it already costs German medium-sized
companies up to 65 billion euros in turnover or 2.2% relative to GDP per year (PwC,
2018). The overall net welfare loss, however, depends on whether the lack of skilled
32The 17% are calculated as the average of the three waves (2006, 2008, 2010) of the DZHW Panel Study of
School Leavers with a Higher Education Entrance Qualification that are available across our observation period.
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workers with completed VET can be replaced by university graduates, e.g., the new BA
graduates, and on the external effects arising from a higher stock of knowledge capital
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2015).
Second, with respect to expected individual returns to education, there may be adverse
impacts at different stages of one’s career. Since VET graduates generally have higher
employment probabilities in the early stages of their career than university graduates
(Brunello and Rocco, 2017; Golsteyn and Stenberg, 2017; Hanushek et al., 2017), young
labor market entrants may encounter greater difficulties in finding adequate jobs initially.
However, over the life cycle, university graduates typically recoup their relative losses and
earn substantially more than VET graduates, which amounts to an estimated average
net gain in lifetime earnings between 151,000 (OECD, 2014) and 420,000 euros (Pfeiffer
and Stichnoth, 2015).33 The individual net return to a university education compared
to VET, however, depends very much on wage adjustments due to a higher supply of
university education, shifts in the skill distribution of new and old graduates as well as
the quality of their job matching. For instance, if firms replace the missing apprentices
with BA graduates doing the same job for the same wage, individuals would experience
a decline in the individual net return to education.
Finally, the lower supply of highly educated apprentices also has fiscal implications.
The net average fiscal return to a university graduate (5 years) compared to a VET
graduate (4 years) in 2012 is estimated at between 100,000 euros (Pfeiffer and Stichnoth,
2015) and 130,000 euros (OECD, 2014).34 Our estimate of a total decrease in highly
educated apprentices of between 3,500 and 5,900 in 2011 due to the Bologna Process
would result in a total reduction in new highly educated apprentices by 16,600 to 27,600
over the whole observation period. Hence, the total net fiscal gain would amount to
approximately 1.66 to 3.59 billion euros over the whole observation period, assuming that
all high school graduates actually go to university instead of doing an apprenticeship and
that drop-out rates for both pathways are the same (VET entry cohort 2012: 24% (BIBB,
2019); university entry cohort 2012/13: 28% (Heublein and Schmelzer, 2018)). Of course,
these figures have to be interpreted with care since there are a number of mitigating
effects possible. If, e.g., fiscal returns for highly educated apprentices are larger than
the average reported by Pfeiffer and Stichnoth (2015) and OECD (2014), the net fiscal
gain would be smaller. The same holds for the case where less-educated apprentices fill
the gap in highly educated apprentices at least partially and their counterfactual is no
33Both individual net returns are estimated as the difference in the net present values of returns and costs
based on typical educational and employment biographies. While Pfeiffer and Stichnoth (2015) use a discount rate
of 1.5%, OECD (2014) gives more weight to present values (3% discount rate). This and further methodological
differences, such as dealing with the variety of the German transfer system, can account for the large differences
in individual net returns obtained (Pfeiffer and Stichnoth, 2015). Note that the value given for the OECD was
calculated by the authors as the average of the value for men (197,000 euros) and for women (63,000 euros).
34Both fiscal net returns are estimated similarly to the individual returns described before, from a public sector
perspective only. The value given for the OECD was again calculated as the average of the value for men (211,000
euros) and for women (92,000 euros).
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post-secondary education. Thus, our back-of-the-envelope calculation can be considered
an upper-bound estimate of the overall effect and should be interpreted with care.
7 Conclusion
We have evaluated the effect of the introduction of BA degrees on the regional supply
of highly educated apprentices. Our empirical estimates show that the reform challenged
the dual apprenticeship system, as more high school graduates from the academic track
decided against apprenticeships (–3% to –5% on average). These findings further reveal
important heterogeneity by gender as well as occupation. The negative effects seem
to be driven in particular by males (–5%), whereas there is little evidence for overall
negative effects for females. ATT effects for those indecisive just before high school
graduation are estimated to be between –18% and –29% in the total sample and –29%
for males. Looking at different occupational areas, the largest negative effects are found
for STEM occupations, which are entirely attributable to men (–7% to –11%). Much
smaller and less consistent negative effects (–3% to –4%) are estimated for the biggest
occupational area, “business”—but mostly for females. Since the gender differences persist
for occupational subgroups, the effect heterogeneity implies that very specific types of
school leavers were affected by the Bologna Process. In particular, those most likely to
take technical apprenticeships (mainly men) experienced the strongest change. They seem
to evaluate their probability of success at university substantially higher than before and
therefore have increased their tendency towards academic study. This is supported by
descriptive evidence on gender gaps in STEM subjects and in self-assessments showing
that in contrast to females, less able males study STEM majors (Cimpian et al., 2020) and
males assess their probability of success significantly more highly than females (Lörz et al.,
2011). For these university-eligible graduates, the Bologna reform may have increased
their matching to universities.
Furthermore, differentiating the number of first-year BA students by areas of study
reveals not only an increase in educational attainment (upgrading) but also some impacts
on major choice. For instance, the decrease in new highly educated male apprentices in
STEM occupations is caused by an increase in first-year BA students in STEM, economics
and “health, social work, education” majors. These switches in occupational pathways to
different, albeit mostly related fields, could have severe consequences for returns to a
university education, as different fields of study offer different payoffs (Altonji et al.,
2012; Kirkeboen et al., 2016). In addition, our findings may have substantial economic
effects. While a reduced supply of highly educated apprentices could aggravate the
skills shortage in Germany, expected individual returns to education could increase, as
university graduates earn on average up to 420,000 euros more than VET graduates
over the life cycle (Pfeiffer and Stichnoth, 2015, 2018). Moreover, the estimated total
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reduction in apprentice supply by high school graduates from the academic track (who
are overcompensated by higher expected individual returns) could result in an upper
bound of a net fiscal gain between 1.66 to 3.59 billion euros in total.
Our study has some limitations due to data restrictions. First, we do not have
comprehensive individual-level data on post-secondary education choices across the whole
implementation of the Bologna Process. Therefore, it would be insightful to review
our results with other data sources (when available) that report actual post-secondary
education choices. Second, due to the inconsistencies in reporting behavior in the SIAB,
we have only estimated effects until 2011. It would be very beneficial to look into more
recent data and investigate whether the trends we observed in this paper have proceeded.
Further research could focus on the labor market effects of the Bologna Process to better
understand the implications for returns to education.
Nevertheless, our study points to important policy implications. Countries that aim to
reform their post-secondary education systems should be aware of the trade-offs that exist
within the system. The impact of such reforms, thus, is not ex ante clear, as a strong
dual apprenticeship system also comes with some considerable benefits. For instance,
countries with poor labor market conditions (such as southern European countries) may
face issues in integrating the increasing number of academic graduates into the labor
market in comparison to a system with a stronger emphasis on VET. Analogously,
countries that aim to strengthen their dual apprenticeship system modeled after Germany
(e.g., Eastern European countries) should take into account the acceleration effect of the
Bologna Process at the expense of highly qualified apprenticeships.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: The education system in Germany
Notes: The figure shows stylized tracks and educational pathways in the German education system.
Figure 2: Comparison of new apprentices identified in different data sources
Notes: The figure shows the sum of new apprentices across time and by type of qualification. Panel A records new
apprentices in absolute terms, Panel B the share of the two different qualification levels. Highly educated refer to
those from the academic school track, less-educated to those from the non-academic school track. Missing values
are imputed via imputation procedure IP1 proposed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006). Apprentices with still missing
information on school qualification are not shown. The numbers identified in the SIAB (2% random sample) are
scaled by factor 50 to account for the total population, shown in colors and marked by triangles. The numbers
obtained from Destatis (2019) are depicted in grey and marked by circles. Calculations by the authors.
Figure 3: New highly educated apprentices by occupational areas and gender
Notes: The figure shows the sum of new highly educated apprentices across time and by four occupational areas.
Panel A shows males, Panel B females. Numbers are obtained from the SIAB and, thus, represent a 2% random
sample of all employees subject to social security contributions in Germany. Calculations by the authors.
Figure 4: Expansion patterns of first-year BA students across regions, areas of study
and years
Notes: The figure shows box plots for different Bologna implementation indicators across German labor market
regions, areas of study and years. The first panel refers to the share of first-year BA students per total first-year
students studying for BA or former degrees, the second panel refers to the absolute number of first-year BA
students. The black horizontal lines depict the median, the red dots the mean, colored boxes the interquartile
range, the black vertical lines the 1.5 interquartile range and the black dots individual observations (i.e., labor
market regions). Labor market regions with less than 50 total first-year students in the specific year are dropped
in the first panel. For reasons of presentation, outliers beyond 5,000 first-year students are excluded in Panel B
(see for maximum value Table A-4 in the appendix). Calculations by the authors.
Figure 5: Composition of total first-year BA students by areas of study
Notes: The figure shows the sum of all first-year BA students by six different areas of study. Panel A reports
absolute numbers, Panel B respective shares. Calculations by the authors.
Figure 6: Generalized event study with three leads and one lag of first-year BA
students
Notes: The figure plots the results from a generalized event study analysis. It allows for multiple events with
varying treatment size with an effect window of three leads and one lag (specified as in equation (13) and (14)
in Schmidheiny and Siegloch (2020)), where the effect at year -1 is normalized to zero. Panel A refers to a
setting including region and year fixed effects as well as the regional controls explained in Section 4.2, Panel B
additionally includes region-specific linear time trends. The graphs show the dynamic effect of the average regional
increase in first-year BA students across the observation period from 1999-2011. Coefficients can be interpreted
as semi-elasticities. 95% confidence intervals are plotted. Calculations by the authors.
Figure 7: Occupation-specific effects by areas of study
Notes: The figure shows estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (2)
separately for all 4 × 5 combinations of occupational areas and major areas. Coefficients represent the θ × 100%
change in new highly educated apprentices in the respective occupational area (panels) due to the average regional
increase in first-year BA students in the respective area of study (y-axis) across the observation period from
1999-2011. ◦ indicates coefficients from a baseline model, including only region and year fixed effects.  adds the
control variables explained in Section 4.2. 2 additionally includes a region-specific linear time trend. Brackets
indicate the share of each occupational area in 2010. The remaining share consists of unassigned or missing
occupations. Detailed regression results are provided in Tables A-7, A-8 and A-9 in the appendix. Calculations
by the authors.
Figure 8: Occupation-specific effects by areas of study and gender
(a) Males
(b) Females
Notes: The figure shows estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (2)
separately for all 4 × 5 combinations of occupational areas and major areas. Coefficients represent the θ × 100%
change in new highly educated apprentices in the respective occupational area (panels) due to the average regional
increase in first-year BA students in the respective area of study (y-axis) across the observation period from
1999-2011. ◦ indicates coefficients from a baseline model, including only region and year fixed effects.  adds the
control variables explained in Section 4.2. 2 additionally includes a region-specific linear time trend. Panel A
refers to regressions for males, Panel B for females. Brackets indicate the share of each occupational area in 2010.
The remaining share consists of unassigned or missing occupations. Detailed regression results are provided in
Tables A-7, A-8 and A-9 in the appendix. Calculations by the authors.
Table 1: Balancing test and BA expansion prediction
Balancing test Expansion prediction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fy BA stud Early Mid Late
Log trainees per 1,000 employees -1.382 0.228 0.342 -0.094
(1.180) (0.825) (0.658) (0.649)
Log school leavers -2.591*** 0.205* 0.263*** 0.303***
(0.715) (0.109) (0.087) (0.086)
Share school leavers w/ uni. entr. qual. 0.016 0.031 0.012 -0.002
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
Unemployment rate 0.118 0.015 -0.051** -0.066***
(0.075) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
Share employment in industry -0.170*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.008
(0.062) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Log pop density 11.776*** -0.043 0.273* 0.362**
(4.475) (0.191) (0.152) (0.150)
Log GDP per capita -3.824** 0.621 -0.114 -0.154
(1.772) (0.536) (0.428) (0.422)
Share employees w/ academic qual. 0.815*** -0.055* 0.034 0.037
(0.302) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023)
Share pop aged 18-25 0.654*** 0.181 0.036 0.048
(0.187) (0.144) (0.115) (0.113)
Share female pop -0.610 0.128 -0.106 -0.200*
(0.659) (0.143) (0.114) (0.113)
Share foreign pop -0.341 0.034 -0.014 -0.045
(0.216) (0.034) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 2115 92 92 92
R2 0.483 0.291 0.540 0.552
F-test 7.854 2.979 8.523 8.963
P-value joint F-test 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports estimates from regressing the number of first-year BA students
(fy BA stud) (column 1) on a set of regional covariates while conditioning on region and
year fixed effects. In addition, the table shows predictions of BA expansion by regional
pre-treatment characteristics in 1999. The dependent variables are defined as: early
expanders = above-median number of first-year BA students in 2005 (column 2); mid
expanders = above-median number of first-year BA students in 2008 (column 3); strong
expanders = above-median number of first-year BA students in 2011 (column 4). The
prediction sample is limited to the 93 regions that contain first-year students in 1999. The
last row reports the p-value from an F-test of joint significance for all regional characteristics.
All coefficients on shares (and unemployment rate) represent the change in first-year BA
students by 1,000 due to a 1-percentage-point change in these shares. All other coefficients
can be interpreted as the change in first-year BA students by 1,000 due to a 1% change in
the respective variable. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of labor market
regions and shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2: Baseline effects of first-year BA students
New highly educated apprentices Mean
2011(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total
First-year BA stud -0.0268* -0.0288* -0.0531*** 2,628
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0169)
Panel B. Males
Male first-year BA stud -0.0506** -0.0485*** -0.0546** 1,488
(0.0204) (0.0186) (0.0229)
Panel C. Females
Female first-year BA stud -0.0076 -0.0109 -0.0379* 1,139
(0.0110) (0.0124) (0.0214)
Observations 2,115 2,115 2,115
Region FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Reg. controls x x
Region × time trend x
Notes: The table shows the average regional effect of first-year BA students on the number of
new highly educated apprentices. Panel A refers to the total number of new apprentices, Panel
B and C derive from separate regressions for males and females. All models are estimated
with a fixed effects Poisson estimator. Regional controls consist of the variables explained in
Section 4.2. Coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities and represent the θ × 100%
change in new apprentices due to the average regional increase in first-year BA students across
the observation period from 1999-2011, which represents the mean in 2011 and is shown in
the last column. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of labor market regions and
shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: Robustness check for baseline effects: Excl. non-university regions
New highly educated apprentices Mean
2011(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total
First-year BA stud -0.0306* -0.0320* -0.0618*** 3,141
(0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0206)
Panel B. Males
Male first-year BA stud -0.0603** -0.0561** -0.0596** 1,778
(0.0254) (0.0229) (0.0284)
Panel C. Females
Female first-year BA stud -0.0086 -0.0120 -0.0451* 1,385
(0.0135) (0.0154) (0.0269)
Observations Panel A 1,740 1,740 1,740
Observations Panel B 1,725 1,725 1,725
Observations Panel C 1,725 1,725 1,725
Region FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Reg. controls x x
Region × time trend x
Notes: The table shows the average regional effect of first-year BA students on the number of
new highly educated apprentices in regions with universities, i.e., excluding those that contain
less than 50 total first-year students in 2011. Panel A refers to the total number of new highly
educated apprentices, Panel B and C derive from separate regressions for males and females.
All models are estimated with a fixed effects Poisson estimator. Regional controls consist
of the variables explained in Section 4.2. Coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities
and represent the θ × 100% change in new highly educated apprentices due to the average
regional increase in first-year BA students across the observation period from 1999-2011, which
represents the mean in 2011 and is shown in the last column. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the level of labor market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance level: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Robustness check for baseline effects: Additional controls
New highly educated apprentices Mean
2011(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total
First-year BA stud -0.0268* -0.0224 -0.0557*** 2,628
(0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0196)
Panel B. Males
Male first-year BA stud -0.0506** -0.0472** -0.0588** 1,488
(0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0248)
Panel C. Females
Female first-year BA stud -0.0076 -0.0018 -0.0397* 1,139
(0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0236)
Observations 2,115 2,115 2,115
Region FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Reg. controls x x
Add. controls x x
Region × time trend x
Notes: The table shows the average regional effect of first-year BA students on the number of
new highly educated apprentices. Panel A refers to the total number of new highly educated
apprentices, Panel B and C derive from separate regressions for males and females. All models
are estimated with a fixed effects Poisson estimator. Regional controls consist of the variables
explained in Section 4.2. Additional controls include the share of employees subject to social
security contributions with academic qualifications, the log GDP per capita, the log population
density, the share of females in the population and the share of foreign-born residents in the
population. Coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities and represent the θ × 100%
change in new highly educated apprentices due to the average regional increase in first-year
BA students across the observation period from 1999-2011, which represents the mean in 2011
and is shown in the last column. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of labor
market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5: Robustness check for baseline effects: Falsification test
New less-educated apprentices Mean
2011(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total
First-year BA stud 0.0011 -0.0066 0.0058 2,628
(0.0172) (0.0070) (0.0185)
Panel B. Males
Male first-year BA stud 0.0135 0.0013 0.0070 1,488
(0.0172) (0.0081) (0.0243)
Panel C. Females
Female first-year BA stud -0.0110 -0.0139 0.0104 1,139
(0.0169) (0.0087) (0.0148)
Observations 2,115 2,115 2,115
Region FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Reg. controls x x
Region × time trend x
Notes: The table shows the average regional effect of first-year BA students on the number
of new less-educated apprentices. Panel A refers to the total number of new less-educated
apprentices, Panel B and C derive from separate regressions for males and females. All models
are estimated with a fixed effects Poisson estimator. Regional controls consist of the variables
explained in Section 4.2. Coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities and represent
the θ × 100% change in new less-educated apprentices due to the average regional increase
in first-year BA students across the observation period from 1999-2011, which represents the
mean in 2011 and is shown in the last column. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level
of labor market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure A-1: Entrants into the post-secondary education system in Germany
Notes: The figure shows new entrants into the academic system (students) and into the three pillars of the VET
system (dual apprenticeship system, full-time vocational schools, transition system) across time. Panel A records
new entrants in absolute terms, Panel B relates them to the number of school leavers in the respective year. Data
provided by Destatis (2018b) and AGER (2018). Calculations by the authors.
Figure A-2: Presence of universities across regions and time
Notes: The figure shows regions with and regions without universities in selected years. Regions without
universities are defined as regions with less than 50 total first-year students from universities or universities
of applied sciences in the respective year. We use 141 regional labor markets according to Kosfeld and Werner
(2012). Geodata is derived from Destatis.
Figure A-3: Share of first-year BA students by regions and selected years
Notes: The figure shows the regional share of first-year BA students per total first-year students studying for BA
or former degrees in selected years. White areas reflect regions with less than 50 total first-year students from
universities or universities of applied sciences in the respective year. We use 141 regional labor markets according
to Kosfeld and Werner (2012). Geodata is derived from Destatis.
Figure A-4: Robustness check: Additional controls and excl. non-university regions
(a) Males
(b) Females
Notes: The figure shows estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (2)
separately for all 4 × 5 combinations of occupational areas and major areas. Coefficients represent the θ × 100%
change in new highly educated apprentices in the respective occupational area (panels) due to the average regional
increase in first-year BA students in the respective area of study (y-axis) across the observation period from
1999-2011. ◦ indicates coefficients from the baseline model in our preferred specification (including region and
year fixed effects, regional controls and region specific linear time trends).  adds further control variables (see
Section 5.3). 2 refers to a subsample of only university regions. Panel A refers to regressions for males, Panel
B for females. Brackets indicate the share of each occupational area in 2010. The remaining share consists of
unassigned or missing occupations. Calculations by the authors.
Figure A-5: Robustness check: Falsification test on new less-educated apprentices
(a) Males
(b) Females
Notes: The figure shows estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a falsification test for equation
(2) using the number of new less-educated apprentices as the dependent variable. Coefficients represent the
θ× 100% change in new less-educated apprentices in the respective occupational area (panels) due to the average
regional increase in first-year BA students in the respective area of study (y-axis) across the observation period
from 1999-2011. ◦ indicates coefficients from the baseline model, including only region and year fixed effects. 
adds control variables (see Section 4.2). 2 additionally includes a region-specific linear time trend. Panel A refers
to regressions for males, Panel B for females. Brackets indicate the share of each occupational area in 2010. The
remaining share consists of unassigned or missing occupations. Calculations by the authors.
Figure A-6: Robustness check: Placebo treatments
(a) Males
(b) Females
Notes: The figure shows estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (1) using
placebo treatments. Coefficients represent the θ×100% change in new highly educated apprentices in the respective
occupational area (panels) due to the average regional increase (or decrease with respect to former degrees) in
first-year students studying for different types of degrees in the respective area of study (y-axis) across the
observation period from 1999-2011. ◦ refers to first-year BA students,  to first-year students studying for former
degrees, and 2 to first-year students studying for teaching certificates. All models include region and year fixed
effects, control variables (see Section 4.2) and region-specific linear time trends. Panel A refers to regressions for
males, Panel B for females. Brackets indicate the share of each occupational area in 2010. The remaining share
consists of unassigned or missing occupations. Calculations by the authors.




111 Occupations in farming Other
112 Occupations in animal husbandry Other
113 Occupations in horsekeeping Other
114 Occupations in fishing Other
115 Occupations in animal care Other
116 Occupations in vini- and viticulture Other
117 Occupations in forestry, hunting and landscape preservation Other
121 Occupations in gardening Other
122 Occupations in floristry Other
211 Occupations in underground and surface mining and blasting engineering STEM
212 Conditioning and processing of natural stone and minerals, production of building materials STEM
213 Occupations in industrial glass-making and -processing STEM
214 Occupations in industrial ceramic-making and -processing STEM
221 Occupations in plastic- and rubber-making and -processing STEM
222 Occupations in colour coating and varnishing STEM
223 Occupations in wood-working and -processing STEM
231 Technical occupations in paper-making and -processing and packaging STEM
232 Occupations in technical media design STEM
233 Occupations in photography and photographic technology Other
234 Occupations in printing technology, print finishing, and book binding STEM
241 Occupations in metal-making STEM
242 Occupations in metalworking STEM
243 Occupations in treatment of metal surfaces STEM
244 Occupations in metal constructing and welding STEM
245 Occupations in precision mechanics and tool making STEM
251 Occupations in machine-building and -operating STEM
252 Technical occupations in the automotive, aeronautic, aerospace and ship building industries STEM
261 Occupations in mechatronics, automation and control technology STEM
262 Technical occupations in energy technologies STEM
263 Occupations in electrical engineering STEM
271 Occupations in technical research and development STEM
272 Draftspersons, technical designers, and model makers STEM
273 Technical occupations in production planning and scheduling STEM
281 Occupations in textile making STEM
282 Occupations in the production of clothing and other textile products Other
283 Occupations in leather- and fur-making and -processing Other
291 Occupations in beverage production Other
292 Occupations in the production of foodstuffs, confectionery and tobacco products Other
293 Cooking occupations Other
311 Occupations in construction scheduling and supervision, and architecture STEM
312 Occupations in surveying and cartography STEM
321 Occupations in building construction Other
322 Occupations in civil engineering Other
331 Floor layers Other
332 Painters, varnishers, plasterers, occup. in waterproof. of build., preserv. of struct. & wooden build. comp. Other
333 Occup. in the interior constr. & dry walling, insulation, carpentry, glazing, roller shutter & jalousie inst. STEM
341 Occupations in building services engineering STEM
342 Occupations in plumping, sanitation, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning STEM
343 Occupations in building services and waste disposal STEM
411 Occupations in mathematics and statistics STEM
412 Occupations in biology STEM
413 Occupations in chemistry STEM
414 Occupations in physics STEM
421 Occupations in geology, geography and meteorology STEM
422 Occupations in environmental protection engineering STEM
423 Occupations in environmental protection management and environmental protection consulting STEM
431 Occupations in computer science STEM
432 Occupations in IT-system-analysis, IT-application-consulting and IT-sales STEM
433 Occupations in IT-network engineering, IT-coordination, IT-administration and IT-organisation STEM
434 Occupations in software development and programming STEM
511 Technical occupations in railway, aircraft and ship operation Other
512 Occupations in the inspection and maintenance of traffic infrastructure Other
513 Occupations in warehousing and logistics, in postal and other delivery services, and in cargo handling Business, Trade, Services
514 Service occupations in passenger traffic Other
515 Occupations in traffic surveillance and control Other
516 Management assistants in transport and logistics Business, Trade, Services
521 Driver of vehicles in road traffic Other
522 Drivers of vehicles in railway traffic Other
523 Aircraft pilots Other
524 Ship’s officers and masters Other
525 Drivers and operators of construction and transportation vehicles and equipment Other
531 Occupations in physical security, personal protection, fire protection and workplace safety Other
532 Occupations in police and criminal investigation, jurisdiction and the penal institution Other
533 Occupations in occupational health and safety administration, public health authority, and disinfection Other
541 Occupations in cleaning services Other
611 Occupations in purchasing and sales Business, Trade, Services
612 Trading occupations Business, Trade, Services
613 Occupations in real estate and facility management Business, Trade, Services
621 Sales occupations in retail trade (without product specialisation) Business, Trade, Services
622 Sales occup. (retail trade) selling clothing, electronic devices, furniture, motor vehicles and other durables Business, Trade, Services
623 Sales occupations (retail) selling foodstuffs Business, Trade, Services
624 Sales occup. (retail) selling drugstore products, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and healthcare goods Business, Trade, Services
625 Sales occupations (retail) selling books, art, antiques, musical instruments, recordings or sheet music Business, Trade, Services
631 Occupations in tourism and the sports (and fitness) industry Business, Trade, Services
632 Occupations in hotels Business, Trade, Services
633 Gastronomy occupations Business, Trade, Services
634 Occupations in event organisation and management Business, Trade, Services
711 Managing directors and executive board members Business, Trade, Services
712 Legislators and senior officials of special interest organisations Business, Trade, Services
713 Occupations in business organisation and strategy Business, Trade, Services
714 Office clerks and secretaries Business, Trade, Services
715 Occupations in human resources management and personnel service Business, Trade, Services
721 Occupations in insurance and financial services Business, Trade, Services
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722 Occupations in accounting, controlling and auditing Business, Trade, Services
723 Occupations in tax consultancy Business, Trade, Services
731 Occupations in legal services, jurisdiction, and other officers of the court Business, Trade, Services
732 Occupations in public administration Business, Trade, Services
733 Occupations in media, documentation and information services Business, Trade, Services
811 Doctors’ receptionists and assistants Health/social work/education
812 Laboratory occupations in medicine Health/social work/education
813 Occupations in nursing, emergency medical services and obstetrics Health/social work/education
814 Occupations in human medicine and dentistry Health/social work/education
815 Occupations in veterinary medicine and non-medical animal health practitioners Health/social work/education
816 Occupations in psychology and non-medical psychotherapy Health/social work/education
817 Occupations in non-medical therapy and alternative medicine Health/social work/education
818 Occupations in pharmacy Health/social work/education
821 Occupations in geriatric care Health/social work/education
822 Occupations providing nutritional advice or health counselling, and occupations in wellness Health/social work/education
823 Occupations in body care Health/social work/education
824 Occupations in funeral services Other
825 Technical occupations in medicine, orthopaedic and rehabilitation STEM
831 Occupations in education and social work, and pedagogic specialists in social care work Health/social work/education
832 Occupations in housekeeping and consumer counselling Health/social work/education
833 Occupations in theology and church community work Health/social work/education
841 Teachers in schools of general education Health/social work/education
842 Teachers for occupation-specific subjects at vocational schools and in-company instructors in voc. training Health/social work/education
843 Teachers and researcher at universities and colleges Health/social work/education
844 Teachers at educational institutions other than schools (except driving, flying and sports instructors) Health/social work/education
845 Driving, flying and sports instructors at educational institutions other than schools Other
911 Occupations in philology Other
912 Occupations in the humanities Other
913 Occupations in the social sciences Other
914 Occupations in economics Business, Trade, Services
921 Occupations in advertising and marketing Business, Trade, Services
922 Occupations in public relations Business, Trade, Services
923 Occupations in publishing and media management Business, Trade, Services
924 Occupations in editorial work and journalism Business, Trade, Services
931 Occupations in product and industrial design Other
932 Occupations in interior design, visual marketing, and interior decoration Other
933 Occupations in artisan craftwork and fine arts Other
934 Artisans designing ceramics and glassware Other
935 Artisans working with metal Other
936 Occupations in musical instrument making Other
941 Musicians, singers and conductors Other
942 Actors, dancers, athletes and related occupations Other
943 Presenters and entertainers Other
944 Occupations in theatre, film and television productions Other
945 Occupations in event technology, cinematography, and sound engineering Other
946 Occupations in stage, costume and prop design Other
947 Technical and management occupations in museums and exhibitions Other
Notes: The table shows the assignment of official occupational groups according to the KldB 2010 of the Federal
Employment Agency to custom occupational areas.
Table A-2: Assignment of fields of study to custom areas of study
Code Name Area of study
01 General Linguistics and Cultural Studies Humanities
02 Protestant Theology, Protes. Religious Education Humanities
03 Catholic Theology, Catholic Religious Education Humanities
04 Philosophy Humanities
05 History Humanities
06 Library Scien., Documentation Science Humanities
07 General Literary Studies, General Linguistics Humanities
08 Classical Philology, Modern Greek Humanities
09 German Studies/German Humanities
10 English Studies, American Studies Humanities
11 Romance Studies Humanities
12 Slavic Studies, Baltic Studies, Finno-Ugrian Studies Humanities
13 Non-Europ. Lang. and Cult. Studies Humanities
14 Cultural Studies Humanities
17 Special Needs Education Health/social work/education
18 Islamic Studies Humanities
22 Sports, Sports Science unassigned
23 General Social Studies Other
24 Regional Studies Other
25 Political Science Other
26 Social Science Other
27 Applied Social Science Health/social work/education
28 Law unassigned
29 Administrative Science Other
30 Business and Economics Economics
31 Business Engineering specialising in Economics Economics
32 Psychology Health/social work/education
33 Educational Science Health/social work/education
36 Mathematics, General Natural Sciences STEM
37 Mathematics STEM




43 Geosciences (excluding Geography) STEM
44 Geography STEM
48 General Health Science Health/social work/education
49 Medicine (General Medicine) unassigned
50 Dentistry unassigned
51 Veterinary Medicine unassigned
57 Land Management Engineering/Landscape Design Other
58 Agricultural Science, Food and Beverage Technology Other
59 Forest Science, Wood Science Other
60 Nutritional and Domestic Sciences Other
61 General Engineering STEM
62 Mining, Metallurgy STEM
63 Mechanical Engineering, Process Engineering STEM
64 Electrical Engineering, Information Engineering STEM
65 Transport Technology, Nautical Science STEM
66 Architecture, Interior Architecture STEM
67 Spatial Planning STEM
68 Civil Engineering STEM
69 Surveying STEM
70 Business Engineering spec. in Engineering Sciences STEM
71 Computer Science STEM
72 Materials Engineering and Technology STEM
74 General Art, Art Theory unassigned
75 Fine Arts unassigned
76 Design unassigned
77 Performing Arts, Film and Television Studies, Theatre Studies unassigned
78 Music, Musicology unassigned
83 Outside the study area classification unassigned
Notes: The table shows the assignment of official fields of study according to the Fächersystematik of Destatis to
custom areas of study. A few majors, where state examinations—and not BA or MA degrees—are still common, remain
unassigned.
Table A-3: Main descriptives for the regional share of first-year BA students per
year
Year N Mean SD Min Max
1997 90 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1998 91 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1999 92 0.692 1.675 0.000 9.868
2000 91 1.941 3.299 0.000 16.109
2001 92 5.385 12.174 0.000 100.000
2002 93 8.629 16.081 0.000 100.000
2003 93 11.581 16.859 0.000 100.000
2004 91 16.586 15.330 0.000 82.182
2005 111 34.222 26.088 0.000 100.000
2006 112 58.289 27.688 0.000 100.000
2007 112 75.028 22.266 0.000 100.000
2008 112 82.955 18.410 4.959 100.000
2009 115 86.633 16.708 8.036 100.000
2010 115 87.539 16.251 10.619 100.000
2011 116 88.330 16.452 8.671 100.000
2012 116 89.861 14.285 36.872 100.000
2013 116 89.949 14.317 36.944 100.000
2014 116 90.089 14.222 39.726 100.000
Notes: The table shows main summary statistics for the regional share of first-year BA
students per year, including number of cases (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum
and maximum values. The share of first-year BA students is calculated by dividing first-year
BA students by first-year BA students plus first-year students studying for former degrees (e.g.,
Diplom). Labor market regions with less than 50 total first-year students in the respective year
are dropped. Calculations by the authors.
Table A-4: Main descriptives for regional first-year BA students per year
Year N Mean SD Min Max Sum
1997 141 0 0 0 0 0
1998 141 0 0 0 0 0
1999 141 13 40 0 285 1,890
2000 141 36 85 0 610 5,040
2001 141 76 140 0 745 10,770
2002 141 130 266 0 2,000 18,360
2003 141 199 382 0 2,755 28,100
2004 141 307 529 0 3,535 43,230
2005 141 614 951 0 7,635 86,610
2006 141 976 1,442 0 11,745 137,590
2007 141 1,478 2,093 0 15,535 208,410
2008 141 1,849 2,546 0 18,035 260,665
2009 141 2,076 2,870 0 20,670 292,710
2010 141 2,187 3,074 0 22,240 308,435
2011 141 2,628 3,659 0 23,995 370,610
2012 141 2,507 3,499 0 24,560 353,465
2013 141 2,576 3,569 0 23,925 363,175
2014 141 2,557 3,574 0 24,170 360,520
Notes: The table shows main summary statistics for regional first-year BA students per year,
including number of cases (N), mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum and maximum values
as well as the sum over all regions. Calculations by the authors.
Table A-5: Overview of definition and sources of variables used
Variable Definition Source
New apprentices absolute SIAB
First-year students absolute Destatis; ICE database
Total school leaver absolute Destatis
School leaver with university entrance
qualification
absolute Destatis
Share of school leavers with university
entrance qualification
[%] Destatis
Unemployment rate [%] Destatis; INKAR
Share of persons in employment in the
industry sector (incl. construction)
[%] Destatis
Population density [Pop per km2] Destatis
Share of firms with more than 250
employees
[%] SIAB
Share of employees subject to social
security contributions with academic
qualification
[%] Federal Employment Agency
GDP per capita [1,000 euros per pop] Destatis
Share of females in the population [%] INKAR
Share of foreign-born residents in the
population
[%] INKAR
Share of population aged 15 to 18 years [%] Destatis
Share of population aged 18 to 25 years [%] Destatis
Trainees per 1,000 employees subject
to social security contributions
- INKAR
Notes: Values for the share of persons in employment in the industry sector (including
construction) were missing for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999, and thus were extrapolated in
order to maintain balanced panel data. The same holds for values for the share of employees with
academic qualifications, which were extrapolated for the years 1997 and 1998 and interpolated
for the year 2011.
Table A-6: Anticipation effects
Log sl w ueq Share sl w ueq Share pop 15-18
(1) (2) (3)
First-year BA studt -0.006 -0.090 0.012
(0.004) (0.093) (0.015)
First-year BA studt+1 -0.002 -0.053 0.015
(0.003) (0.088) (0.018)
First-year BA studt+2 -0.002 -0.128 0.022
(0.003) (0.097) (0.021)
Observations 2,115 2,115 2,115
Reg and Year FE x x x
Reg Controls x x x
Notes: The table reports estimates from regressing the log number of school
leavers with university entrance qualification (log sl w ueq), the share of
school leavers with university entrance qualification (share sl ueq) and the
share of the population aged 15 to 18 (share pop 15-18) on the number of
first-year BA students in year t, year t+1 and year t+2. All coefficients on
shares represent the one percentage point effect of an increase in first-year
BA students by 1,000, the coefficient on logs the x×100% effect respectively.
All models include region and year fixed effects as well as the set of regional
controls explained in Section 4.2. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
level of labor market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance level:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A-7: Detailed results for occupation-specific effects without controls and
region-specific linear time trends
First-year BA
students in...
HSE Business STEM Other Mean
2011(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Total
Humanities 0.0131 -0.0036 -0.0156 -0.0122 230
(0.0147) (0.0075) (0.0107) (0.0267)
Health/social/educ. 0.0089 -0.0241** -0.0370* -0.0611 240
(0.0162) (0.0103) (0.0190) (0.0396)
Economics 0.0177 -0.0105 -0.0524*** -0.0291 593
(0.0169) (0.0092) (0.0181) (0.0390)
STEM 0.0112 -0.0136 -0.0661*** -0.0289 1184
(0.0236) (0.0141) (0.0191) (0.0405)
Other -0.0128 -0.0165** -0.0219 -0.0088 160
(0.0208) (0.0082) (0.0134) (0.0254)
Panel B. Males
Humanities -0.0217 0.0094 -0.0357*** -0.0431 70
(0.0212) (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0315)
Health/social/educ. 0.0096 -0.0215 -0.0475** -0.1010** 49
(0.0219) (0.0152) (0.0200) (0.0476)
Economics 0.0076 0.0034 -0.0799*** -0.0609 313
(0.0264) (0.0173) (0.0238) (0.0470)
STEM 0.0313 -0.0062 -0.0916*** -0.0557 894
(0.0331) (0.0248) (0.0236) (0.0515)
Other -0.0167 -0.0174 -0.0390*** -0.0369 71
(0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0142) (0.0317)
Panel C. Females
Humanities 0.0228 -0.0112 0.0539** 0.0211 160
(0.0158) (0.0081) (0.0216) (0.0361)
Health/social/educ. 0.0035 -0.0229** 0.0397 -0.0092 189
(0.0223) (0.0101) (0.0274) (0.0536)
Economics 0.0127 -0.0188** 0.0369 0.0199 280
(0.0271) (0.0092) (0.0245) (0.0425)
STEM 0.0085 -0.0142 0.0273 0.0099 289
(0.0266) (0.0106) (0.0245) (0.0447)
Other -0.0160 -0.0126* 0.0435** 0.0358 89
(0.0272) (0.0075) (0.0200) (0.0283)
Notes: The table shows effects of estimating equation (2) separately for all 4× 5 combinations
of occupational areas and major areas without regional controls and region-specific linear time
trends. HSE = “health, social work, education”. The dependent variables are new highly
educated apprentices in the respective occupational area (columns), the treatment variable
first-year BA students in the respective area of study (rows). Panel A refers to the total
number of new highly educated apprentices, Panel B and C derive from separate regressions
for males and females. Coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities and represent the
θ × 100% change in new highly educated apprentices due to the average regional increase
in first-year BA students in the respective area of study across the observation period from
1999-2011, which represents the mean in 2011 and is shown in the last column. All models
include region and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of labor
market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A-8: Detailed results for occupation-specific effects with controls
First-year BA
students in...
HSE Business STEM Other Mean
2011(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Total
Humanities 0.0080 -0.0033 -0.0075 -0.0254 230
(0.0145) (0.0088) (0.0137) (0.0266)
Health/social/educ. 0.0089 -0.0296** -0.0238 -0.0642 240
(0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.0390)
Economics 0.0149 -0.0141 -0.0439*** -0.0411 593
(0.0131) (0.0116) (0.0157) (0.0364)
STEM 0.0099 -0.0204 -0.0563*** -0.0499 1184
(0.0184) (0.0173) (0.0187) (0.0431)
Other -0.0188 -0.0193* -0.0214 -0.0245 160
(0.0178) (0.0110) (0.0137) (0.0245)
Panel B. Males
Humanities -0.0275 0.0104 -0.0257 -0.0579* 70
(0.0230) (0.0139) (0.0172) (0.0325)
Health/social/educ. 0.0055 -0.0250 -0.0365* -0.1040** 49
(0.0243) (0.0168) (0.0208) (0.0454)
Economics 0.0036 0.0013 -0.0676*** -0.0716* 313
(0.0249) (0.0186) (0.0210) (0.0421)
STEM 0.0358 -0.0117 -0.0798*** -0.0799 894
(0.0320) (0.0271) (0.0246) (0.0494)
Other -0.0241 -0.0194 -0.0386** -0.0548* 71
(0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0150) (0.0287)
Panel C. Females
Humanities 0.0186 -0.0118 0.0566** 0.0079 160
(0.0162) (0.0087) (0.0225) (0.0377)
Health/social/educ. 0.0068 -0.0285** 0.0516* -0.0128 189
(0.0180) (0.0116) (0.0272) (0.0552)
Economics 0.0098 -0.0225** 0.0384 0.0088 280
(0.0203) (0.0106) (0.0261) (0.0441)
STEM 0.0058 -0.0195 0.0329 -0.0040 289
(0.0208) (0.0121) (0.0245) (0.0508)
Other -0.0208 -0.0152* 0.0417** 0.0222 89
(0.0230) (0.0085) (0.0205) (0.0302)
Notes: The table shows effects of estimating equation (2) separately for all 4×5 combinations of
occupational areas and major areas without region-specific linear time trends. HSE = “health,
social work, education”. The dependent variables are new highly educated apprentices in the
respective occupational area (columns), the treatment variable first-year BA students in the
respective area of study (rows). Panel A refers to the total number of new highly educated
apprentices, Panel B and C derive from separate regressions for males and females. Coefficients
can be interpreted as semi-elasticities and represent the θ×100% change in new highly educated
apprentices due to the average regional increase in first-year BA students in the respective area
of study across the observation period from 1999-2011, which represents the mean in 2011 and
is shown in the last column. All models include region and year fixed effects as well as the
regional controls explained in Section 4.2. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level
of labor market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table A-9: Detailed results for occupation-specific effects with controls and
region-specific linear time trends
First-year BA
students in...
HSE Business STEM Other Mean
2011(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Total
Humanities 0.0093 -0.0114 -0.0211 0.0129 230
(0.0222) (0.0110) (0.0296) (0.0313)
Health/social/educ. 0.0116 -0.0310* -0.0570* 0.0847 240
(0.0314) (0.0161) (0.0310) (0.0595)
Economics 0.0594* -0.0116 -0.0641** -0.0145 593
(0.0307) (0.0188) (0.0315) (0.0441)
STEM 0.0319 -0.0355 -0.0915** 0.1150 1184
(0.0527) (0.0284) (0.0366) (0.0879)
Other -0.0092 -0.0274** -0.0188 0.0317 160
(0.0244) (0.0129) (0.0295) (0.0417)
Panel B. Males
Humanities -0.0046 0.0153 -0.0289 0.0234 70
(0.0500) (0.0208) (0.0329) (0.0487)
Health/social/educ. 0.0647 0.0136 -0.0674*** -0.0069 49
(0.0397) (0.0158) (0.0222) (0.0622)
Economics 0.0564 0.0489* -0.1060*** -0.0441 313
(0.0740) (0.0253) (0.0283) (0.0560)
STEM 0.0640 0.0260 -0.1100** 0.1170 894
(0.1010) (0.0364) (0.0457) (0.1300)
Other -0.0349 -0.0043 -0.0458* 0.0125 71
(0.0327) (0.0140) (0.0243) (0.0371)
Panel C. Females
Humanities 0.0146 -0.0259** 0.0403 -0.0034 160
(0.0209) (0.0129) (0.0468) (0.0572)
Health/social/educ. 0.0111 -0.0443** 0.0532 0.1990* 189
(0.0402) (0.0223) (0.0869) (0.1080)
Economics 0.0565 -0.0413* 0.1380 0.1210 280
(0.0406) (0.0224) (0.0984) (0.0792)
STEM 0.0235 -0.0497 0.0106 0.1380 289
(0.0443) (0.0319) (0.0931) (0.1350)
Other -0.0076 -0.0240 0.0947** 0.0664 89
(0.0261) (0.0190) (0.0462) (0.0770)
Notes: The table shows effects of estimating equation (2) separately for all 4× 5 combinations
of occupational areas and major areas. HSE = “health, social work, education”. The dependent
variables are new highly educated apprentices in the respective occupational area (columns),
the treatment variable first-year BA students in the respective area of study (rows). Panel
A refers to the total number of new highly educated apprentices, Panel B and C derive from
separate regressions for males and females. Coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities
and represent the θ × 100% change in new highly educated apprentices due to the average
regional increase in first-year BA students in the respective area of study across the observation
period from 1999-2011, which represents the mean in 2011 and is shown in the last column. All
models include region and year fixed effects as well as the regional controls explained in Section
4.2. Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of labor market regions and shown in
parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A-10: Robustness check for baseline effects: Excl. years 2000-2004
New highly educated apprentices Mean
2011(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total
First-year BA stud -0.0275** -0.0329** -0.0544** 2,628
(0.0133) (0.0157) (0.0247)
Panel B. Males
Male first-year BA stud -0.0534*** -0.0571*** -0.0483 1,488
(0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0321)
Panel C. Females
Female first-year BA stud -0.0063 -0.0112 -0.0489 1,139
(0.0114) (0.0150) (0.0303)
Observations 1,410 1,410 1,410
Region FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Reg. controls x x
Region × time trend x
Notes: The table shows the average regional effect of first-year BA students on the number of
new highly educated apprentices excluding the years 2000 to 2004. Panel A refers to the total
number of new highly educated apprentices, Panel B and C derive from separate regressions for
males and females. All models are estimated with a fixed effects Poisson estimator. Regional
controls consist of the variables explained in Section 4.2. Coefficients can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities and represent the θ × 100% change in new highly educated apprentices due
to the average regional increase in first-year BA students across the observation period from
1999-2011, which represents the mean in 2011 and is shown in the last column. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the level of labor market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A-11: Robustness check for baseline effects: Tuition fees
New highly educated apprentices Mean
2011(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Total
First-year BA stud -0.0100 -0.0112 -0.0553*** 2,628
(0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0179)
Tuition fees 0.0603* 0.0555* -0.0217
(0.0337) (0.0327) (0.0424)
Fy BA stud × tuition fees -0.0400*** -0.0441*** 0.0028
(0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0166)
Panel B. Males
Male first-year BA stud -0.0238** -0.0218** -0.0516* 1,488
(0.0120) (0.0096) (0.0289)
Tuition fees 0.0916** 0.1070** 0.0251
(0.0463) (0.0439) (0.0665)
Male fy BA stud × tuition fees -0.0554*** -0.0550*** -0.0037
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0250)
Panel C. Females
Female first-year BA stud 0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0393* 1,139
(0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0228)
Tuition fees 0.0317 0.0123 -0.0516
(0.0423) (0.0422) (0.0557)
Female fy BA stud × tuition fees -0.0249 -0.0330** 0.0007
(0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0229)
Observations 2,115 2,115 2,115
Region FE x x x
Year FE x x x
Reg. controls x x
Region × time trend x
Notes: The table shows the average regional effect of first-year BA students on the number of
new highly educated apprentices. Panel A refers to the total number of new highly educated
apprentices, Panel B and C derive from separate regressions for males and females. Tuition
fees is a dummy variable indicating whether tuition fees were in place in a certain region in
a certain year. All models are estimated with a fixed effects Poisson estimator. Regional
controls consist of the variables explained in Section 4.2. Coefficients can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities and represent the θ × 100% change in new highly educated apprentices due
to the average regional increase in first-year BA students across the observation period from
1999-2011, which represents the mean in 2011 and is shown in the last column. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the level of labor market regions and shown in parentheses. Significance
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
